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Abstract 
We investigate all listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock Exchanges on extreme market 
movement days over 2010 to 2017, and highlight the important role of price limit on post extreme day 
stock returns. Utilising daily cash flow data of the largest trading group as a proxy of institutional 
investors trading behaviour, we identify institutional investors’ consistently destabilizing effects on 
extreme days across two markets. We further show the upper (lower) price limit hitting stocks continue 
to increase (decrease) for at least two subsequent days, and find evidence of long run price reversal for 
lower hitting stocks. Finally we find the greater net buy by large traders the higher abnormal return in 
three subsequent days of the upper price limit hitting regular stocks, while the net sell on extreme days 
tend to predict the positive subsequent abnormal returns.  
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1. Introduction 
The recent Chinese stock market turbulence over 2015 to 2016 has attracted attention from global 
investors who are seeking benefits from international risk sharing and portfolio diversification. Specific 
questions of interest are: Who drives to the abnormal stock returns in these extreme days? What’s the 
pattern of stock returns on post extreme days, particularly for stocks hitting the price limit? Could the 
post extreme day stock return be predicted by trading activities involved in the extreme day? The 
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answers to those questions are important since it contributes to a better understanding of Chinese equity 
markets. 
In order to identify the sources of extreme swings, current studies examine the trading behaviour of 
institutional investors by using quarterly institutional ownership data as the proxy for institutional 
trading on extreme movement days in U.S. stock market (Dennis and Strickland, 2002) and Chinese 
stock market (Tian et al., 2018). Dennis and Strickland (2002) are the first to investigate on extreme 
days in U.S. stock market, and find firm’s abnormal return on these days is associated with percentage 
of institutional ownership. Unlike Dennis and Strickland (2002), Tian et al. (2018) documents a 
stabilizing effect of institutional ownership on firm’s abnormal returns in China’s stock market. 
However, the quarterly horizon of institutional holding conceals important details about the undisclosed 
short-term activities, see in Campbell, et al. (2009) and Boehmer and Kelley (2009) among others. 
Therefore, it is vital to explore other appropriate measure of institutional trading through which the 
extreme market swings could be better explained. Following Dennis and Strickland (2002), we define 
extreme market days as the large movement days when the absolute market return exceeds three or two 
standard deviation above its mean. As cash flow plays important role in explaining stock returns1, we 
use a more appropriate proxy for institutional daily trading, i.e. the daily cash flow data collected from 
RESSET database. Similar to the Chen et al. (2019), we first acquire cash flow data of the largest group 
where the cash inflow and outflow of each transaction are above one million Chinese RMB. According 
to the distribution of market value held by retail investors2, it is reasonable to assume most transactions 
by largest group is initiated by institutional investors. We then investigate the impact of large trading 
on extreme day return and find i) the large traders are net buyer (seller) on extreme up (down) days; ii) 
a consistent and significant evidence that the large traders, mostly comprised by institutional investors, 
play a destabilizing role on stock abnormal returns, however, they tends to reduce abnormal turnover 
on extreme down days.  
Furthermore, an ignored fact in extreme market swings in Chinese stock markets is that substantial 
stocks hit upper (lower) price limit3 on up (down) extreme movement days4. Therefore, it is worthwhile 
to examine post extreme day stock return, particularly for stock hitting the price limit, during extreme 
market swings. This paper identifies the source of extreme movement days by using daily trading data 
                                                          
1 See among others, Jotikasthira et al., 2012; Kirchler et al., 2015; Razena et al., 2017; Jiang and Yuksel, 2017; 
Yang and Yang, 2019. 
2 According to retail investors’ holding value data from China Securities Depository & Clearing Corporation 
Limited, the percentage of retail accounts whose stock holding market value exceeding 1 million in 2011 and 
2016 are only 0.82% and 2.75%. 
3 Chinese stock market sets daily 10% price limit for regular stocks and 5% for special treatment (ST) stocks. 
4 In 09 June 2015 when the market return of Shanghai Composite Index is 5.76%, for example, 87.7% listed 
tradable A-shares hit upper price limit. 
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in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets respectively from 2010 to 2017, followed by an extensive 
investigation on post extreme day price-limit-hitting stock returns over different horizons.  
In our post extreme day study, we are particularly interested in the returns of stocks hitting price limit 
(i.e. ±10% limit hitting for regular stocks and ±5% limit hitting for special treatment (ST) stocks) on 
extreme days, given that the findings of whether price limit leads to delayed price discovery or price 
reversal effect in China’s stock market is mixed (Chen, et al., 2004; Wong et al. 2009 and Li, et al., 
2014, Chen, et al., 2019). Following Chen et al. (2019) while setting the subsequent returns over 
different horizon from overnight up to 120 days, we find that i) the returns of post extreme days 
consistently continue to increase (decrease) at least two subsequent days for regular stocks hitting 10% 
(-10%) price limit. The finding contrasts with Chen et al. (2019) who find a significantly moderate price 
reversal on subsequent first day in term of open-to-close return, indicating that the price limit plays a 
more pronounced role of delayed price discovery after extreme days; ii) there is long run price reversal 
evidence for lower hitting sample in extreme down days but not upper hitting sample in up days; and 
iii) Similar moderate patterns can be found for ST stocks. 
Using a similar set-up proposed by Chen et al. (2019), we also investigate whether the net buying 
(selling) of large trading investors on up (down) extreme days predict the stronger delayed price 
discovery return. Interestingly, we find significant evidence of predictive power of net buying (selling) 
on returns of near subsequent days in two stock markets, the power of which is more marked for regular 
stocks. In sum, large trading behaviour by large investors, dominated by institutions, not only 
exacerbates the volatile market, but also impacts on the returns on post extreme days. 
This paper contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, we use the daily cash flow data by largest 
trading group, as dominated by institutional investors, as the proxy for institutional trading. We find 
large investors have a consistently destabilizing effect on extreme market swings in most cases except 
for extreme down days where the abnormal turnover has been reduced. Unlike Tian et al. (2018), our 
finding indicates that the quarterly institutional ownership data is less likely to capture the short-term 
institutional trading activity.  
Second, we highlight the importance of  price limit effect on extreme market swings and identify 
determinants of post extreme day performance particularly for price limit hitting samples. We further 
provide strong evidence of continuous increase (decrease) after extreme up (down) days for upper 
(lower) price limit hitting sample.  
Third, we present evidence that the net buy (sell) by large traders has strong predictive power on post 
extreme day returns, reflecting institutional investors not only exacerbates the volatile markets but 
affects the post extreme day performances particularly for price limit hitting stocks as well. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the extant literature and develop 
the hypotheses. Section 3 describes data and measures of variables. Section 4 introduces the 
methodology and Section 5 presents key findings. Finally Section 6 concludes. All extreme days in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market and the analysis of ST stocks can be accessed in Appendix A and 
B respectively. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Extreme days 
Cash flow has been well documented as an important factor in explaining stock returns. Kirchler et al. 
(2015) examine the impact of cash and trader inflow on price efficiency with a novel multi-period 
experimental asset market setting, and find the joint inflow of cash and traders triggers strong 
overreaction and price run-ups. In a laboratory asset market research, Razena et al. (2017) show that 
market exhibits bubbles and crashes when is associated with cash flow and long trading horizon. 
Jotikasthira et al. (2012) find the investors flows of international funds has significant price impact in 
emerging markets, thereby resulting in their return co-movement. They also find that the flow-
performance relation of fund plays a destabilizing positive-feedback effect on the underlying markets. 
By using data of fund flow, Jiang and Yuksel (2017) examine the flow-performance relation for full 
sample of U.S. domestic equity mutual funds, and document a significantly positive relation between 
fund flow and subsequent fund performance. In another words, funds with net inflow outperform funds 
with net outflow for the subsequent one month. 
 In a more recent study focusing on Chinese stock market, Yang and Yang (2019) develop cash flow 
inflow-outflow imbalance index by using individual stock cash flow data of Chinese listed companies 
from 2008 to 2015 from RESSET database, and find that the inflow-outflow imbalance index is 
important in explaining stock excess return. However, the trading of investors by different size may 
have different effect on stock returns. Similar to Chen et al. (2019), we focus on large traders, as 
dominated by institutional investors in China, as they tend to be more sophisticated investors and likely 
to have larger impact on the stock returns on extreme days. According to the retail investors’ holding 
value information in China, the cash flow data by largest investor acts as the compelling proxy for daily 
institutional trading in our study, which makes it possible to investigate the institutional investors 
trading behaviour on extreme days on daily frequency. 
The trading behaviour of institutional and individual investors in stock market has attracted much 
attention in financial literature. Two well-documented trading behaviours of institutional investors are 
herding, which refers to following other institutional investors to buy (sell), and positive feedback 
trading, which refers to buying past winners and selling past losers (Lakonishok et al., 1992, Nofsinger 
and Sias, 1999, Sias, 2004). However, the evidence of whether institutional investor stabilizes or 
5 
 
destabilizes the stock market in literature remains mixed. Lakonishok et al. (1992) show the 
destabilizing market effect from funds herding and positive-feedback trading behaviour, and Dennis 
and Stricklands (2002) demonstrate a destabilizing effect of institutional trading behaviour in large 
market movement days as well. While others find that the trading behaviour by institutional investors 
help stabilize the stock market by speeding the price-adjustment process (Wermers, 1999), reducing 
stock price volatility (Li and Wong, 2010) and alleviating the abnormal returns in market swings 
(Lipson and Puckett, 2010; Tian, et al. 2018). 
Dennis and Strickland (2002) investigate the relationship between the stock returns and ownership 
structure in volatile markets when absolute value of market return is two percent or more in U.S. stock 
market from 1988 to 1996. They find the firm’s abnormal return and abnormal turnover on these days 
are significantly related to its institutional ownership. Using the institutional ownership as the proxy for 
institutional trading, they suggest that institutional investors play a destabilizing role in the large 
movement days due to the positive feedback herding behaviour. A more recent research by Tian et al. 
(2018) focuses on performance of listed firms on Shanghai Stock Exchange on extreme swings on 
China’s stock market from 2003 to 2014. Tian et al. (2018) also use percentage of institutional 
ownership as the proxy for institutional trading, and unlike Dennis and Strickland (2002), they suggest 
a stabilizing effect of institutional investors in China’s stock market, in which, institutional investors 
are systematically buying more than retail investors during large market movement days, particularly 
on extreme market down days. 
Few studies examines the institutional trading behaviour on stock performance in extreme movement 
days due to the less availability of institutional daily trading data (e.g. Tian et al., 2018). Using a 
database with institutional daily trading data in U.S. stock market from 1999 to 2005, Lipson and 
Puckett (2010) find a stabilizing effect of institutional investors in market swings, in which institutional 
investors are net buyers (sellers) during extreme market declines (increases). The impact of institutional 
trading on stock return and turnover on extreme movement days in China’s stock market remains an 
unexplored question. In this paper, we use the large trading as the proxy for institutional trading and 
test the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1. Large investors, mostly referred as institutional investors, tend to perform net buy (sell) 
trading behaviour on extreme up (down) market movement days. The daily trading by large traders 
exacerbates the Chinese volatile markets. 
2.2 Post extreme days 
2.2.1 Post extreme day performance 
A notable characteristic in China’s stock market is that substantial listed shares hit the price limit on 
large movement days. In an extreme down day of 24 August, 2015, for an example, 87.4% listed A-
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shares in Shanghai Stock Exchange hit the lower price limit. Therefore it is important to analyse the 
delayed price discovery effect that prevent prices from efficiently reaching their equilibrium level post 
extreme days (Kim and Rhee, 1997).  
Price limit rule has been popular in emerging market where stock market trading is dominated by retail 
investors, as it helps cool off the market and gives investors a time-out period on large movement days. 
However, the question of whether the stock will continue to rise (fall) after upper (lower) price limit hit 
in China’s stock market is mixed in literature. Chen et al. (2004) investigate the effectiveness of price 
limit on Chinese listed A shares from 1996 to 2003 which provides evidence of price delayed effect on 
upward price movements but not on downward price movements. Wong et al. (2009) investigate the 
magnet effects of price limit in Shanghai Stock Exchange from Jan 2002 to Dec 2002. In post-limit-hit 
analysis, they find evidence of delayed price discovery at the ceiling but price reversal at the floor. Li 
et al. (2014) investigate the effectiveness, cause and impact of price limit of China’s listed stocks in 
China (A shares), Hong Kong (H shares) and New York (N shares) over the period from stock’s new 
listing data to May 2011.  
Contrary to Chen et al. (2005) and Wong et al. (2009), they report the effectiveness of price limit in 
preventing price continuation. A more recent research by Chen et al. (2019) documents the destructive 
market behaviour of price limit, using the account-level data from Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the 
period from 2012 to 2015. They find the stock price continues to increase on the next day after upper 
limit hitting and eventually reverses over the long-run. Despite the number of price hit samples becomes 
larger in the extreme market days relative to normal trading days, the effectiveness of price limit on 
extreme market days remains unexplored question. We thus test the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2. The price of regular (ST) stocks continue to increase or decrease in near subsequent days 
after price limit hitting of ±10% (±5%) on extreme market days and eventually reverses in the long run. 
2.2.2 Post extreme day return and large trading 
Few studies examine the predictive power of trading behaviour on stock returns of following days. Chen 
et al. (2019) is the first in examining the predictive power of large investors on stock’s subsequent 
returns over the different horizons from day 1 to day 120 relative to the days of price limit hitting. They 
find the evidence of stronger price reversal in post upper limit-hitting days when the net buying by large 
investors in limit-hitting days is greater, which is explained by that institutional investor is likely to 
conduct pump-and-dump strategy where push stocks to price limit to arouse the attention of other 
investors and sell it on the next day. 
In order to examine whether the large trading, mostly initiated by institutional investors, in extreme 
days has the predictive power to post extreme day return, we then test the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 3. The large trading on extreme day has the predictive power to post extreme day return 
and the power is more pronounced for the price limit-hitting regular stock on extreme day. 
3. Data and measurement of variables 
Our datasets include the daily market information, quarterly information of ownership concentration 
and institutional holding, and daily large amount trading of all listed A-shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock market over the period from Jan 2010 to Dec 2017. The daily market information and ownership 
concentration data are derived from China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). 
Finally, the cash flow data is sourced from RESSET (www.resset.cn) database. 
3.1 Extreme days 
Similar to Dennis and Strickland (2002), we define extreme movement days in Shanghai (Shenzhen) 
stock market when absolute value of market return (i.e. Shanghai (Shenzhen) Composite Index) exceeds 
two standard deviations above mean. Therefore, the cut-offs of absolute value in defining extreme day 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market are 2.90% and 3.44% respectively. As such, we have 106 
(including 49 up and 57 down days) extreme days in Shanghai stock market and 116 extreme days 
(including 45 up and 71 down days) in Shenzhen stock market. Notably, a large amount of stock hits 
upper (lower) price limit in up (down) extreme days, particularly in Shenzhen stock market. We have 3 
up extreme days and 4 down extreme days in Shenzhen stock market, in which the percentage of upper 
and lower price limit hit number accounts for more than 80%. All the information of extreme days and 
price limit hit is illustrated in Appendix A. 
3.2 Key variables 
3.2.1 Large trading data 
We obtain daily cash flow data of all listed A-shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 
RESSET database, which classifies all individual buy-initiated and sell-initiated trading transaction into 
four categories based on the trading amount level of each transaction, which are i) less than 50 thousand 
RMB; ii) between 50 and 300 thousand RMB; iii) between 300 thousand and 1 million RMB and iv) 
bigger than 1 million RMB. Ware particularly interested in the trading behaviour in the last group, 
because the trading of which is mostly dominated by institutional investor. According to retail investors’ 
holding value data from China Securities Depository & Clearing Corporation Limited, the percentage 
of retail accounts whose stock holding market value exceeding 1 million in 2011 and 2016 are only 
0.82% and 2.75% respectively. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the trading in last group in mostly 
contributed by institutional investor. As such, similar to Chen et al. (2019), the key variables we define, 
for the proxies for daily institutional trading, are i) NETBUY, defined as the net cash inflow of the 
group where the amount of each transaction is above 1 million RMB and ii) NETSELL, as the negative 
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value of NETBUY, defined as the net cash outflow of the group where the amount of each transaction 
is above 1 million RMB. NETBUY and NETSELL have been scaled by the number of stock’s total 
tradable shares. 
3.3 Dependent variables 
3.3.1 Extreme day 
Consistent with Dennis and Strickland (2002) and Tian et al. (2018), we examine the performance of 
all listed A-shares on extreme day by abnormal return and abnormal turnover. Abnormal return is 
computed from the market model estimated from the time horizon from 250 to 50 prior to the extreme 
days (hereafter, [-250, -50]). Abnormal turnover is the difference between turnover on extreme days 
and the median turnover upon [-250, -50]. Turnover is represented as the trading volume on extreme 
day scaled by the total tradable shares outstanding.  
3.3.2 Post extreme day 
We also examine performance of listed A-share on post extreme day, and particularly the shares hitting 
price limit on extreme day is our core interest. Similar to Chen et al. (2019), we firstly examine i) CTO, 
which refers to the return calculated from the close price in extreme day and the open price in the 
following day and ii) OTC, which refers to the return calculated from the open and close price on the 
following day relative to extreme day. We also examine a set of abnormal returns for each share based 
on the different horizon, which are i) abnormal return of 1st  2nd , 3rd , 4th  and 5th day relative to extreme 
day and ii) cumulative abnormal return from [6, 10], [11, 20], [21, 60] and [61, 120] relative to extreme 
day. 
3.4 Control variables 
In accordance with the prior extreme day studies (Dennis and Strickland, 2002 and Tian, et al. 2018), 
we include a set of control variables as i) SIZE, which is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity 50 days prior to the extreme day; ii) TURNOVER, which is daily volume expressed as a 
percentage of shares outstanding on extreme day; iii) VARIANCE, which is market model residual 
variance for days [-250,-50] and iv) BETA, which is computed using returns for days [-250,-50] for the 
Shanghai or Shenzhen Composite index.  
The inclusion of size is to ensure the relationship between abnormal return and shareholder composition 
or large trading is not driven by size. This is due to i) institutional investors prefer to invest in large 
firms (e.g. Lakonishok et al., 1992); and ii) firm size is documented as the risk factor (Banz, 1981; 
Fama and French, 1993). Turnover ratio is included for the liquid factor as institutional investors are 
documented to prefer liquid stocks (Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). Variance is stock 
idiosyncratic risk and proxies for information asymmetries. Relative to retail investor, institutional 
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investors are document as informed investor (e.g. Wermers, 2000; Li and Wang, 2010) and the 
institutional holding is expected to be negatively related to information asymmetry. The inclusion of 
stock variance is to alleviate the concerns that institutional investors may be averse to invest in stocks 
with lower idiosyncratic stocks (Falkenstein, 1996). Beta is included also for another proxy for firm 
risk. 
3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of key variables used in extreme days of Shanghai and 
Shenzhen market when the absolute market return is two standard deviation above mean. And extreme 
days are separated into up or down extreme days according to whether market return is positive or 
negative.  
We observe 38740 firm-day observations in Shanghai up extreme days, which is less than 45411 firm-
day observations in Shanghai down extreme days, indicating a significant asymmetry distribution of 
extreme days in Shanghai stock market. The distribution becomes more asymmetry toward downside 
in Shenzhen stock market, in which 45411 firm-day observations included in up days, which is much 
less than 76972 firm-day observations in down days. 
The sign of NETBUY and NETSELL is one of our core interests in this study, as it reflects the trading 
direction of large trading investors, mostly initiated by institutional investors. And the NETBUY and 
NETSELL data has been multiplied by 100 for convenience. The mean or median NETBUY and 
NETSELL in up and down days of two market are all positive, indicating that, on average, the large 
trading investors tend to buy in extreme up days and sell in extreme down days in Chinese extreme 
stock market. The mean of NETBUY is 0.191 (0.258) in Shanghai (Shenzhen) up days, much higher 
than the mean of NETSELL as 0.024 (0.008) in Shanghai (Shenzhen) down days, indicating more 
pronounced exacerbating effect by large trading on up day relative to down day. 
Regarding the discernible differences in four control variables in our study between two markets, table 
1 reports the statistics of larger size of listed shared, less turnover, variance and beta in Shanghai stock 
market relative to Shenzhen stock market. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of key variables used in extreme day of Shanghai and Shenzhen market 
when the absolute market return is two standard deviation above mean. RETURN is stock returns in extreme day. 
NETBUY (NETSELL) refer to net buying (selling) of the large trading, as defined earlier and has been multiplied 
by 100 for convenience. SIZE, TURNOVER, BETA and VARIANCE are control variables, as defined earlier. 
 Mean Min 25th Median 75th Max Std. NOB 
Panel A: Shanghai up extreme days 
RETURN 0.041 -0.1 0.021 0.037 0.059 0.106 0.031 38740 
NETBUY 0.191 -27.209 0 0.037 0.199 27.473 0.913 38740 
NETSELL -0.191 -27.473 -0.199 -0.037 0 27.209 0.913 38740 
SIZE 22.543 19.081 21.736 22.355 23.133 28.374 1.185 38740 
TURNOVER 0.032 0 0.012 0.023 0.041 0.523 0.031 38740 
BETA 1.08 -0.545 0.838 1.116 1.338 2.687 0.361 38740 
VARIANCE 0.072 0.002 0.034 0.057 0.095 2.059 0.062 38740 
Panel B: Shanghai down extreme days 
RETURN -0.056 -0.101 -0.093 -0.055 -0.033 0.101 0.037 45411 
NETBUY -0.024 -10.324 -0.167 -0.038 0.008 23.447 0.658 45411 
NETSELL 0.024 -23.447 -0.008 0.038 0.167 10.324 0.658 45411 
SIZE 22.556 19.081 21.736 22.388 23.185 28.429 1.212 45411 
TURNOVER 0.032 0 0.012 0.023 0.042 0.502 0.032 45411 
BETA 1.074 -0.275 0.833 1.104 1.342 3.971 0.353 45411 
VARIANCE 0.083 0.002 0.042 0.067 0.105 59.354 0.286 45411 
Panel C: Shenzhen up extreme days 
RETURN 0.052 -0.1 0.033 0.047 0.069 0.102 0.028 48173 
NETBUY 0.258 -15.405 0 0.08 0.287 21.932 0.67 48173 
NETSELL -0.258 -21.932 -0.287 -0.08 0 15.405 0.67 48173 
SIZE 22.01 18.983 21.32 21.977 22.67 26.001 1.053 48173 
TURNOVER 0.041 0 0.017 0.031 0.054 0.604 0.036 48173 
BETA 1.226 -1.291 1.046 1.239 1.418 2.329 0.263 48173 
VARIANCE 0.117 0.003 0.043 0.073 0.112 375.562 3.295 48173 
Panel D: Shenzhen down extreme days 
RETURN -0.059 -0.101 -0.096 -0.06 -0.037 0.102 0.037 76972 
NETBUY -0.008 -13.74 -0.144 -0.012 0.024 27.578 0.655 76972 
NETSELL 0.008 -27.578 -0.024 0.012 0.144 13.74 0.655 76972 
SIZE 21.94 18.817 21.215 21.919 22.62 26.004 1.062 76972 
TURNOVER 0.038 0 0.015 0.029 0.05 0.591 0.036 76972 
BETA 1.196 -2.189 1.016 1.197 1.383 5.611 0.268 76972 
VARIANCE 0.098 0.003 0.038 0.063 0.099 353.624 1.881 76972 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Extreme day 
Our main hypothesis in extreme day study is that institutional investors exacerbate the volatile market. 
Given that the quarterly ownership data does not reflect well the clear pattern of institutional trading on 
extreme day (Campbell, et al. 2009; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009), we follow the set-up by Dennis and 
Strickland (2002) and use daily trading data to test the effect institutional trading on firm performance 
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on extreme days across two stock markets. We also measure the firm performance in extreme days by 
abnormal return and abnormal turnover. 
4.1.1 Abnormal return 
According to the insights provided by table 1 that large trader tend to conduct net buying trades in up 
extreme days and net selling trades in down extreme days, we further use NETBUY and NETSELL in 
up and down extreme days respectively to investigate the Hypothesis 1 that the firm performance on 
extreme day is associated with the large amount trading, as predominately initiated by institutional 
investors. We then run the following regressions in up extreme day using Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
approach: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖 + 𝛾5𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (1) 
where, 𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the abnormal returns of firm i in extreme days; 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖 is the net buy value of large 
amount trading scaled by number of total tradable shares outstanding for firm i. All other variables are 
defined as earlier. 
𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑁𝐸𝑌𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  (2) 
where, 𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖 is the abnormal returns of firm i in extreme days; All other variables are defined as 
earlier. 
We then run the regression above in down extreme days using NETSELL variable. 
𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖 + 𝛾5𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (3) 
where, 𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the abnormal returns of firm i in extreme days; 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖 is the net buying of large 
amount trading (each sell-initiated transaction above 1 million RMB) scaled by number of total tradable 
shares outstanding for firm i. All other variables are defined as earlier. 
𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑁𝐸𝑌𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (4) 
where, 𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖 is the abnormal returns of firm i in extreme days; All other variables are defined as 
earlier. 
4.2 Post extreme day 
4.2.1 Performance of post extreme day 
In order to test the hypothesis that whether return of price limit hitting shares continue to rise (fall) on 
days subsequent to extreme days (Hypothesis 2). Similar to Chen et al. (2019), we test the abnormal 
returns subsequent to hitting the upper or lower price limit and other key inner price range in extreme 
days. The time horizon for post extreme day returns is extended to 120 days relative to extreme days. 
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We decompose the first day return into i) CTO (i.e. overnight return), which refers to the return 
calculated from the close price in extreme day and the open price in the following day and ii) OTC, 
which refers to the return calculated from the open and close price on the following day relative to 
extreme day. We also test the cumulative abnormal return over time horizon of [6, 10], [11, 20], [21, 
60] and [61, 120] relative to extreme day. Due to the different price limit level, we further separate the 
stocks into regular and ST stocks. 
 
4.2.2 Post extreme day return and large trading 
We proceed to investigate whether the net buy (net sell) of the largest trading investors on upper (lower) 
price-limit-hitting stock has predictive power for the subsequent price reversal (Hypothesis 3). Despite 
we would like to consistently use the technique of Fama-MacBeth (1973) where uses the time-series 
average of cross-sectional coefficients to make the inference, the different time horizon between net 
buy (net sell) on extreme day and subsequent (cumulative) abnormal return creates problem. Therefore, 
similar to Chen et al. (2019), we pool stock-day observations in our extreme up or down sample based 
on Shanghai or Shenzhen stock market. The samples of regular and ST stocks in regression are separated 
due to their different levels on price limit. We demonstrate the methodology of analysis on regular 
stocks as below and the methodology of ST stocks can be accessed in Appendix B. 
The regression of regular stocks in extreme up days is specified as follows: 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛→𝑡+𝑚 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾5𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑆𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑆𝐼𝑋 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾9𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾11𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾12𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾13𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 𝑛, 𝑚 𝜖{1,2,3,4,5,10,20,60,120}                                                                                                 (5) 
where, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛→𝑡+𝑚 is the dependent variable, referring to the market-adjusted abnormal returns on 
day 1,2,3,4,5 and cumulative abnormal returns over days [6, 10], [11, 20], [21, 60] and [61, 120] for 
stock i after up extreme day t. 𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is dummy variable and equals to one if the stock i on event t 
hits the up price limit. 𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are also dummies, referring to inner price range 
for stock i in extreme day t over 8% to 9.99%, 6% to 7.99% and 4% to 5.99%. All other variables are 
defined same as earlier. 
The coefficient on the interaction term between UPPER and NETBUY is our core interest in the study. 
The positive coefficient of 𝛾3 translates Hypothesis 3, indicating the stronger price delayed effect after 
upper-price-limit hits with greater net buy of large trading investors in up extreme days. 
The regression of regular stocks in extreme down days is specified as follows: 
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𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛→𝑡+𝑚 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾4𝑁𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑁𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑋 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾9𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾11𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾12𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾13𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 𝑛, 𝑚 𝜖{1,2,3,4,5,10,20,60,120} (6) 
where, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛→𝑡+𝑚 is the dependent variable, referring to the market-adjusted abnormal returns on 
day 1,2,3,4,5 and cumulative abnormal returns over days [6, 10], [11, 20], [21, 60] and [61, 120] for 
stock i after up extreme day t. 𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is dummy variable and equals to one if the stock i on event t 
hits the lower price limit. 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡, 𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are also dummies, referring to inner price 
range for stock i in extreme day t over -9.99% to -8 %, -7.99% to -6 % and -5.99% to -4%. All other 
variables are defined as earlier. 
The coefficient on the interaction term between LOWER and NETSELL is our core interest in the study. 
The positive coefficient of 𝛾3 translates Hypothesis 3, indicating the stronger price delayed effect after 
lower-price-limit hits with greater net buy of large trading investors in down extreme days. 
5. Findings 
5.1 Extreme day 
5.1.1 Abnormal returns 
Table 1 contains results in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market respectively from separately estimating 
Eq. (1), (2), (3) and (4) for extreme up and down days using Fama-MacBeth (1973) technique over the 
years from 2010 to 2017. We focus on large amount trading, as mostly initiated by institutional investors, 
and its impact on stock abnormal returns and abnormal turnover in extreme market days. 
To be more specific, we are particularly interested in the impact of net buy (sell) by the large investors 
on stock return on extreme up (down) extreme days in China’s stock market. Column (1) and (3) ((2) 
and (4)) in table 2 present the relationship between stock abnormal return and net buy (sell) in extreme 
up (down) days in two stock exchanges. Our previous descriptive statistics suggest, on average, large 
traders perform the positive net buy and net sell trading behaviour in up and down extreme days 
respectively. In table 2, the coefficient of net buy of large trading investors is positively (negatively) 
significant at 1% in both two stock markets, suggesting a destabilizing effect of large traders on stock 
returns on extreme movement days. Moe specifically, the coefficient of NETBUY (NETSELL) in 
Shanghai stock market is 1.898 (-2.809), which corresponds to an increase (decrease) of approximately 
1.9% (2.8%) in stock returns for a 1% increase of share, in total tradable shares outstanding, by net buy 
(sell) from large trading investors on up (down) extreme days. The destabilizing effect of large trading 
investors become more pronounced in Shenzhen stock market. Overall, our finding suggests that the 
large traders, predominated by institutional investors, play an evident destabilizing effect on China’s 
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extreme days, which is contrary to the indication of stabilizing effect of institutional ownership (Tian 
et al., 2018). We highlight the importance of distinguishing the impacts between quarterly institutional 
ownership and daily institutional trading on stock return in extreme days, because quarterly changes in 
ownership do not provide a clear picture of the trading patterns of institutions since quarterly horizon 
can mask important details about their undisclosed short-term activities (Campbell, et al., 2009, 
Boehmer and Kelley, 2009).  
 
Table 2 Abnormal returns and turnover on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market 
This table investigates the effects of large trading, mostly initiated by institutional investors, on stock abnormal 
returns and abnormal turnovers of all listed A-shares on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange on extreme 
market movement days over 2010 to 2017.  This table presents the results from Eq. (1), (2), (3) and (4) by using 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. The dependent variables are stock abnormal return (AR) on extreme day, 
calculated from market model over [-250, -50]; and abnormal turnover (ATURN), calculated from difference 
between turnover on extreme days and the median turnover upon [-250, -50].  The key variables are NETBUY 
and NETSELL, referring to the net buy and sell by large investors on extreme days. All other variables are same 
as defined earlier. 
 Dependent variables: Abnormal returns Dependent variables: Abnormal turnovers 
 Shanghai stock market Shenzhen stock market Shanghai stock market Shenzhen stock market 
 Up day Down day Up day Down day Up day Down day Up day Down day 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NETBUY 1.898***  1.406***  1.981***  1.939***  
 (10.010)  (9.536)  (19.037)  (13.206)  
NETSELL  -2.809***  -2.529***  -1.419***  -1.137*** 
  (-11.848)  (-16.163)  (-10.179)  (-6.876) 
SIZE 0.0001 0.003*** -0.001** 0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 
 (0.201) (4.988) (-2.185) (6.180) (-3.268) (-2.561) (-1.779) (-1.046) 
TURNOVER -0.033* 0.128*** -0.046*** 0.084***     
 (-1.860) (5.723) (-3.383) (4.250)     
VARIANCE 0.007 -0.046*** 0.012* -0.025*** -0.047*** -0.060*** -0.065*** -0.052*** 
 (0.844) (-4.995) (1.695) (-3.445) (-4.654) (-6.214) (-6.091) (-6.254) 
BETA -0.022*** 0.023*** -0.021*** 0.026***     
 (-12.285) (8.740) (-11.726) (12.307)     
Constant 0.020 -0.094*** 0.052*** -0.109*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.032* 0.022 
 (1.144) (-6.226) (3.972) (-8.408) (3.710) (3.197) (1.900) (1.592) 
Observations 38,740 45,411 48,173 76,972 38,740 45,411 48,173 76,972 
R2 0.595 0.510 0.397 0.333 0.445 0.413 0.382 0.352 
 
5.1.2 Abnormal turnovers 
Column (5), (6), (7) and (8) in table 1 reports the impact of NETBUY and NETSELL on stock abnormal 
turnover on extreme days, the independent variables of which is our core interest. Surprisingly, the 
empirical evidence reports that the net buy by large trading investors (NETBUY) exacerbates the 
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abnormal return on up extreme days whereas the net sell (NETSELL) decreases the abnormal return on 
down extreme days. More specifically, one percentage increase of NETBUY by large investors 
corresponds to, on average, an increase of approximately 1.981 (1.939) percentage on abnormal 
turnover in Shanghai (Shenzhen) extreme up days. However, in Shanghai (Shenzhen) extreme down 
days, one percentage increase of NETSELL tend to decrease the abnormal turnover by approximately 
1.419 (1.137) percentage. To sum up, the trading behaviour of large traders have different impact on 
the abnormal turnover between up and down extreme days. A potential explanation is that the more 
panic selling on down extreme days induced by large trading investors lead to more samples of price 
limit hitting, which decreases the liquidity of stocks (e.g. Kim and Rhee, 1997). 
5.2 Post extreme day 
5.2.1 Abnormal returns in post extreme days 
Table 3 and Table 4 report the price pattern of post extreme day performance for stocks hitting upper 
(lower) price limit on extreme up (down) days in Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) respectively over 2010 to 2017. Similar to Chen et al. (2019), we also compare the 
price limit hitting samples with stocks, the closing returns of which falls into different key ranges (e.g. 
9% to 10%, 8% to 9%). We further separate i) regular stocks and ST stocks in each table due to their 
different limit of price hitting; and ii) up and down extreme days in each tables. Consistently, the 
abnormal return is calculated from market model over days [-250, -50] relative to each extreme day. 
Regular stocks 
With respect to the first subsequent day performance for regular stocks in Shanghai up extreme days, 
the first row of Panel A in Table 3 reports the close-to-open (CTO) return on average is 2.64% 
(significant at 1% level), and continue to increase during the first day’s trading hours by average 1.52% 
(significant at 1% level), which contrasts with the finding by Chen et al. (2019) that a small amount of 
price reversal is found in first day’s close price relative to open price in all days’ investigation over 
2012 to 2015. Our result indicates a more pronounced continuous price increase in the first subsequent 
day relative extreme days for up price limit hitting stocks. Further, the price continues to rise on average 
1.78% (significant at 1% level) in the second subsequent day for upper price limit hitting stocks on 
extreme up days, and a significant pattern of price reverse is found in day 3 and day 4. However, there 
is no consistent evidence of price reverse in the long run.  When in comparison with the post extreme 
day performance of large returns (without up limit hitting) on extreme up days, in general, a significant 
price reverse is found in the three subsequent days relative to extreme days, which differs evidently 
with the price limit hitting samples, indicating the important role of price limit plays on the post extreme 
day performance. 
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In the extreme down markets in Shanghai stock market, the last row in Panel B shows the price pattern 
following lower-limit hits. The close-to-open price (CTO) of -2.49% (significant at 1% level) indicates 
the significant drop of stock price by 2.49% on average at the open price of first day, and continued 
with moderate drop of open-to-close (OTC). Afterward, the stocks keep a downward tendency for 
several subsequent days and have a price reversal in the long run. For example, the cumulated abnormal 
returns of [61, 120] for lower price limit hitting sample on down extreme day is 1.86% (significant at 
1% level). In comparison to price limit samples, the stock prices of other large inner range drop more 
moderate than lower price limit hitting samples in near subsequent days, reflecting the important 
continuous price decreasing effect of lower price limit. 
Overall, the continue increase (decrease) of price pattern in subsequent days is observed in up (down) 
days for upper (lower) price limit hitting samples in SHSE. Further, a long-run price reversal is observed 
in lower price limit samples, but not in upper price limit samples. The price pattern of stocks in SZSE 
is consistent with SHSE. 
ST stocks 
The findings of ST stocks can be accessed in Appendix B. Panel A (Panel B) in Table B-1 and Table 
B-2 demonstrate the price pattern for ST stocks. The upper limit hitting ST stocks exhibit continue price 
increase pattern in SZSE but not in SHSE. Further, there is no long run price reversal detected for upper 
hitting ST stock in both two markets. 
With respect to the price pattern of ST stocks in extreme down days, however, a significant continuous 
price decrease is found in both two markets. In other words, the lower hitting ST stocks drops 
significantly at CTO, followed by a moderate small price reversal at OTC, and keeps significant 
downward price drop for at least four subsequent days. A small long run price reverse of 0.99% 
(significant at 1% level) is found for ST stocks in SZSE but not SHSE. 
Overall, the price pattern of post extreme days for ST stocks largely depend on the up or down of 
extreme days. The lower price limit hitting of ST stocks continue to drop on the subsequent days, and 
the upper price limit hitting ST stocks do not exhibit such pattern. Further, generally there is no 
significant price reverse pattern in long run for ST limit hitting samples. 
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Table 3 Post extreme day performance of regular stocks in Shanghai stock market 
Table 3 presents the stock abnormal returns subsequent to extreme days in Shanghai stock market. The sample includes all stocks listed in Shanghai stock market from 2010 to 
2017. CTO refers to the return calculated from the close price in extreme day and the open price in the following day. OTC refers to the return calculated from the open and 
close price on the following day. Day 2, 3, 4 and 5 refer to the abnormal return on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th relative to extreme day. [6, 10], [11, 20], [21, 60] and [61, 120] refer 
to the cumulative abnormal return from time window over 6th to 10th, 11th, to 20th, 21st to 60th, and 61st to 120th day relative to extreme day. The abnormal return is calculated 
as using stock’s daily return minus the expected return derived from market model. The table reports log returns. “***”, “**” and “*” represent the significance level at 0.1%, 
1% and 5% respectively. 
 CTO OTC Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 [6, 10] [11, 20] [21, 60] [61, 120] No. 
Panel A Regular stocks in Shanghai up extreme days 
Upper Hit 2.64%*** 1.52%*** 1.31%*** -0.78%*** -0.41%*** 1.06%*** 2.06%*** -2.94%*** 1.69%*** 0.06% 3300 
[9%, 10%) -0.06% -0.16% -0.45%** -0.24% 0.51%*** 0.54%*** 0.49% -5%*** 1.09%* 0.52% 1050 
[8%, 9%) -0.59%*** -0.38%** -1.08%*** -0.39%** 0.73%*** -0.02% 0.31% -3.14%*** 1.83%*** -0.99%** 1139 
[7%, 8%) -0.27%*** 0.3%** -0.53%*** -0.36%*** 0.38%*** -0.04% 0.17% -2.61%*** 1.03%** -0.66%* 1542 
[6%, 7%) -0.25%*** 0.49%*** -0.47%*** -0.06% 0.02% -0.18%* 0.55%* -1.42%*** 1.22%*** 0.05% 2310 
[5%, 6%) -0.21%*** 0.8%*** -0.3%*** 0.17%** -0.01% 0.07% 1.23%*** -0.86%*** 1.02%*** 0.87%*** 3249 
[-5%, 5%) -0.16%*** 0.55%*** 0.03% 0.05%** -0.42%*** 0.08%*** 1.22%*** 0.29%*** 1.76%*** 0.95%*** 24770 
(-10%, -5%) -1.35%*** 0.8% -2.21%*** -2.22%*** -3.2%*** -0.12% -4.03% -3.38% 2.74% -1.96% 64 
Lower Hit -7.54%*** 5.43%** -5.52%*** -4.28%** -5.01%** -1.33% -8.78% -5.69% 3.27% 3.68% 18 
Panel B Regular stocks in Shanghai down extreme days 
Upper Hit 0.09% 1.53%** -0.22% -0.65% -1.11%** -0.82%* 2.02% -1.55% -1.76% 3.5%** 180 
[5%, 10%) -2.18%*** 2.01%*** 0.01% -1.19%*** -0.87%** -1.33%*** 0.18% -0.56% 0.41% 1.1% 280 
[-5%, 5%) -0.51%*** 0.67%*** -0.17%*** -0.17%*** -0.5%*** -0.3%*** 0.76%*** 0.37%*** 0.72%*** 1.19%*** 18362 
[-6%, -5%) -0.46%*** 0.23%*** 0% -0.15%** -0.42%*** -0.09%* 0.59%** 0.76%*** 0.85%*** 1.11%*** 4139 
[-7%, -6%) -0.56%*** 0.25%*** -0.09% -0.21%*** -0.45%*** -0.08% 0.65%** 0.31% 0.38%* 1.06%*** 3389 
[-8%, -7%) -0.66%*** 0.42%*** -0.05% -0.47%*** -0.42%*** 0.09% 0.86%** 0.66%* 0.8%*** 0.81%*** 2768 
[-9%, -8%) -0.45%*** 0.3%** -0.07% -0.7%*** -0.51%*** 0.34%*** 0.71%* 0.8%** 0.65%** 0.91%*** 2368 
(-10%, -9%) -0.66%*** 0.63%*** -0.02% -0.42%*** -0.39%*** 0.04% 0.76%** 0.61%* 0.11% 1.28%*** 3528 
Lower Hit -2.49%*** -0.24%** -0.86%*** -0.94%*** -0.81%*** -1.25%*** -3.56%*** 2.93%*** -0.13% 1.86%*** 8678 
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Table 4 Post extreme day performance of regular stocks in Shenzhen stock market 
Table 4 presents the stock abnormal returns subsequent to extreme days in Shenzhen stock market. The sample includes all stocks listed in Shenzhen stock market from 2010 
to 2017. CTO refers to the return calculated from the close price in extreme day and the open price in the following day. OTC refers to the return calculated from the open and 
close price on the following day. Day 2, 3, 4 and 5 refer to the abnormal return on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th relative to extreme day. [6, 10], [11, 20], [21, 60] and [61, 120] refer 
to the cumulative abnormal return from time window over 6th to 10th, 11th, to 20th, 21st to 60th, and 61st to 120th day relative to extreme day. The abnormal return is calculated 
as using stock’s daily return minus the expected return derived from market model. The table reports log returns. “***”, “**” and “*” represent the significance level at 0.1%, 
1% and 5% respectively. 
 CTO OTC Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 [6, 10] [11, 20] [21, 60] [61, 120] No. 
Panel A Regular stocks in Shenzhen up extreme days 
Upper Hit 2.59%*** 0.8%*** 0.46%*** -0.15%** -0.09% 0.44%*** 1.46%*** 0.36% 1.41%*** 1.63%*** 5925 
[9%, 10%) -0.15% -0.4%*** -0.41%*** -0.38%*** 0.43%*** 0.01% 1.56%*** 0.51% 1.19%** 1.12%** 1460 
[8%, 9%) -0.51%*** 0.02% -0.27%*** -0.25%** 0.46%*** 0% 1.91%*** 0.67% 1.53%*** 0.84%** 1848 
[7%, 8%) -0.57%*** 0.3%*** -0.24%*** 0.09% 0.35%*** 0.04% 2.68%*** 0.96%*** 1.87%*** 0.48%* 2612 
[6%, 7%) -0.24%*** 0.6%*** -0.1%* -0.03% 0.16%*** -0.01% 2.15%*** 0.92%*** 1.28%*** 1.11%*** 3868 
[5%, 6%) -0.11%*** 0.74%*** -0.07% -0.01% 0.16%*** 0.15%*** 1.98%*** 0.96%*** 1.39%*** 1.27%*** 5772 
[-5%, 5%) -0.14%*** 0.81%*** -0.09%*** -0.11%*** -0.07%*** -0.03%* 1.46%*** 1.12%*** 1.43%*** 1.46%*** 25993 
(-10%,-5%) -2.06%*** -1.11% -2.13%*** -1.93%** -3.01%*** -0.37% -3.19% -0.17% 3.2% 0.18% 44 
Lower Hit -9%*** 1.67%* -5.42%*** -3.54%*** -1.04% -1% 2.58% -0.68% 1.6% 2.92%* 56 
Panel B Regular stocks in Shenzhen down extreme days 
Upper Hit -0.14% 3.25%*** 0.89%** 0.33% 0.3% -0.79%*** 1.05% 2.79%** 1.48%* 2.31%*** 393 
[5%, 10%) -1.98%*** 2.65%*** -0.71%*** -0.67%*** -0.53%** -0.74%*** -0.54% 0.06% 2.06%** 1.52%** 485 
[-5%, 5%) -0.79%*** 1.14%*** 0.02% -0.12%*** -0.2%*** -0.08%*** 0.9%*** 0.96%*** 1.02%*** 1.11%*** 28513 
[-6%,-5%) -0.57%*** 0.72%*** 0.13%*** 0.08%** 0.02% 0.02% 1.21%*** 1.06%*** 1.16%*** 1.09%*** 7857 
[-7%,-6%) -0.67%*** 0.65%*** 0.11%*** 0.03% 0.02% 0.11%*** 1.5%*** 1.3%*** 1.26%*** 1.27%*** 6848 
[-8%,-7%) -0.72%*** 0.76%*** 0.15%*** 0% 0.04% 0.11%** 1.76%*** 1.3%*** 1.25%*** 1.32%*** 5401 
[-9%,-8%) -0.92%*** 0.87%*** 0.21%*** -0.01% 0.12%** 0.13%** 2.18%*** 1.24%*** 1.01%*** 1.27%*** 4403 
(-10%,-9%) -0.86%*** 0.85%*** 0.32%*** 0.23%*** 0.13%** 0.2%*** 2.29%*** 1.43%*** 1.45%*** 1.69%*** 5238 
Lower Hit -2.92%*** -0.49%*** -0.19%*** 0.02% 0.16%*** 0.12%*** 2.28%*** 2.9%*** 1.36%*** 2.09%*** 16653 
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5.2.2 Post extreme day return and large trading 
Regular stocks 
Panel A and Panel B in Table 5 (Table 6) report the regression analysis of Eq. (5) and (6) for regular 
stocks in Shanghai (Shenzhen) extreme up and down days respectively.  
For regular stocks in up extreme days (Panel A in Table 5 and Table 6), the coefficients of our key 
interest, as of the interaction term UPPER*NETBUY, are consistently positive over the three 
subsequent days relative to extreme days in two stock market, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3 
that stronger price continuous increase after upper price limit hits with larger net buy of large traders, 
mostly as initiated by institutional investors. Specifically, the coefficient of UPPER*NETBUY in first 
subsequent day relative to Shanghai (Shenzhen) extreme up day is 0.468 (1.413), corresponding to that, 
on average, the increase of one percentage of net buy by large traders on Shanghai (Shenzhen) extreme 
up day will lead to approximately an increase of 0.468% (1.413%) abnormal return on the first 
subsequent day for upper price limit hitting stock.  
Our finding contrast with Chen et al. (2019) where the negative coefficient of interaction term is found 
for full samples over 2012 to 2015, reflecting the fact that the net buy by large traders not only 
exacerbate the abnormal return in extreme days, but also contribute to higher returns in near subsequent 
days for stocks hitting upper price limit. Such patterns are not found in the stock with large inner stock 
return in extreme days, which further highlight the distinctive price movement patterns for price limit 
hitting stock. Furthermore, the coefficient of NETBUY also translates the predictive power on stock 
returns on subsequent days. The coefficients of NETBUY in SZSE are significantly negative over the 
four following days, though the significance is only found in the second following day in SHZE. The 
finding indicates the predictive power of NETBUY on price reversal of near subsequent days, 
particularly in Shenzhen stock market. 
For regular stocks in down extreme days (Panel B in Table 5 and Table 6), the coefficients of interaction 
term LOWER*NETSELL are significantly positive in subsequent three days relative to extreme days 
in SZSE, indicating the stronger price reversal in near following days for stocks hitting lower price limit 
on extreme days, with the increase of NETSELL. In Shanghai stock market, however, the similar 
patterns are not identified. Nonetheless, the coefficient of NETSELL in SHSE in the first following day 
is 0.167 and significant at 1% level, translating an average increase of 0.167% abnormal stock return in 
first subsequent day with the increase of one percentage of net buy by large traders. All these positive 
coefficients associated with NETSELL in two stock exchanges indicate that the net sell on extreme 
down days, largely due to panic selling, predict the positive returns on the near subsequent days. 
20 
 
ST stocks 
In Appendix B., Panel A and Panel B in Table B-3 (Table -4) reports the regression analysis of Eq. (B-
1) and (B-2) for ST stocks in Shanghai (Shenzhen) extreme up and down days respectively. On 
Shanghai up extreme days, we also find the significantly positive coefficients of NETBUY in 
subsequent two days relative to extreme days, which is supportive to the predictive power of NETBUY 
on returns for ST stocks hitting 5% price limit. More specifically, one percentage increase of NETBUY 
will lead to an average increase of return with 0.607% on first day following Shanghai up extreme days. 
The coefficients of interaction term, however, are mostly insignificant. 
On down extreme days, the positive coefficient of interaction term LFIVE*NETSELL on first 
subsequent day in Shanghai stock market suggests that the price reversal is stronger for ST stocks hitting 
the down price limit with the increase of NETSELL on Shanghai extreme day. However, the similar 
pattern does not exist on Shenzhen stock market. In sum, the predictive power of net buy or net sell in 
extreme days on subsequent days is more moderate for ST stocks compared to regular stocks. 
Table 5 Regression analysis of regular stocks in Shanghai Stock Exchange 
This table reports the regression evidence of regular stocks estimated from Eq. (5) and (6) in extreme days in 
Shanghai stock market over 2010 to 2017, while samples are further separated according to from up or down 
extreme day. Panel A reports the findings in extreme up days, in which the key variable UPPER refers to regular 
stocks hitting 10% price limit and NETBUY refers to net buy of large trading investors. Panel B reports the 
regressions for regular stocks in extreme up days, in which the key variable LOWER refers to regular stocks 
hitting -10% price limit and NETSELL refers to net sell of large trading investors. All other variables are same as 
defined earlier. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
Panel A Regular stocks from Shanghai up extreme days 
 AR Day1 AR Day2 AR Day3 AR Day4 AR Day5 
CAR 
[6,10] 
CAR 
[11,20] 
CAR 
[21,60] 
CAR 
[61,120] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
UPPER 0.035*** 0.011*** -0.008*** 0.004*** 0.01*** 0.005 
-
0.031*** 
-0.006* 
-
0.008*** 
 (25.644) (9.959) (-7.368) (3.432) (10.979) (1.302) (-7.825) (-1.848) (-2.6) 
NETBUY 0.056 -0.14*** 0.017 0.088** -0.03 0.145 
-
0.482*** 
-0.292* -0.07 
 (1.082) (-3.271) (0.473) (2.109) (-0.836) (0.94) (-2.631) (-1.687) (-0.598) 
UPPER* 
NETBUY 
0.468*** 0.497*** 0.192** -0.397*** -0.111* 0.008 1.252*** 0.762*** 0.256 
 (4.61) (6.163) (2.461) (-4.994) (-1.701) (0.035) (4.258) (3.393) (1.266) 
[8%, 10%) -0.01*** -0.009*** -0.003*** 0.012*** 0.001 -0.007* 
-
0.041*** 
-0.008** 
-
0.014*** 
 (-8.047) (-8.381) (-2.746) (11.542) (0.86) (-1.723) (-9.5) (-2.221) (-4.518) 
[8%, 10%)* 
NETBUY 
0.661*** 0.669*** 0.11 -0.423*** -0.028 -0.842 1.389** 1.483*** 0.893** 
 (3.83) (4.801) (0.924) (-3.137) (-0.248) (-1.353) (2.427) (3.158) (1.975) 
[6%, 8%) 0 -0.004*** -0.001* 0.007*** 
-
0.002*** 
-
0.009*** 
-0.02*** 
-
0.006*** 
-
0.012*** 
 (-0.012) (-5.97) (-1.72) (9.375) (-3.357) (-3.38) (-7.263) (-2.82) (-5.641) 
[6%, 8%)* 
NETBUY 
-0.035 0.408*** -0.027 -0.304*** -0.206** -0.005 1.229*** 0.176 0.694** 
 (-0.315) (3.187) (-0.194) (-3.501) (-2.488) (-0.012) (4.226) (0.505) (2.546) 
[4%, 6%) 0.006*** -0.001*** 0.001 0.003*** -0.001** 0.001 
-
0.008*** 
-
0.008*** 
-0.002 
 (10.485) (-2.772) (1.378) (6.005) (-2.547) (0.538) (-4.586) (-5.294) (-1.431) 
[4%, 6%)* 
NETBUY 
-0.494*** 0.555*** 0.315*** 0.188* -0.026 0.779** 0.879** 0.549 -0.08 
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 (-4.348) (5.716) (2.889) (1.897) (-0.231) (2.018) (1.965) (1.523) (-0.251) 
SIZE -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0*** 0.001** 0.001 
-
0.003*** 
-0.001** 
 (-9.082) (-5.559) (-6.387) (7.007) (-3.383) (2.186) (1.022) (-6.046) (-2.461) 
TURNOVER -0.127*** -0.103*** -0.077*** -0.036*** -0.009 -0.043 
-
0.206*** 
-0.065** 
-
0.099*** 
 (-12.907) (-10.776) (-9.03) (-4.424) (-1.112) (-1.38) (-6.817) (-2.201) (-3.708) 
VARIANCE 0.009*** -0.016*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.054*** 
-
0.042*** 
0.002 -0.006 
 (2.929) (-4.279) (3.676) (5.542) (5.526) (4.116) (-2.615) (0.216) (-0.663) 
BETA -0.004*** -0.01*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 
-
0.003*** 
-
0.013*** 
0.028*** 0.002 0.006*** 
 (-5.99) (-19.05) (11.11) (-10.089) (-6.443) (-5.508) (11.723) (0.78) (3.187) 
constant 0.04*** 0.031*** 0.014*** -0.017*** 0.012*** -0.002 -0.032** 0.079*** 0.034*** 
 (11.536) (9.743) (4.609) (-6.434) (4.407) (-0.178) (-2.369) (7.504) (2.884) 
Number 37409 37408 37408 37408 37408 37405 37394 37349 37240 
R.2 0.082 0.04 0.014 0.015 0.011 0.003 0.021 0.002 0.003 
Adjust.R.2 0.082 0.039 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.003 0.02 0.002 0.002 
Panel B Regular stocks from Shanghai down extreme days 
LOWER -0.027*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 0 
-
0.007*** 
-0.04*** 0.034*** 
-
0.008*** 
0.006*** 
 (-34.3) (-9.085) (-8.428) (0.235) (-11.313) (-14.922) (14.534) (-4.323) (4.042) 
NETSELL 0.167** 0.033 0.071 -0.025 -0.08 -0.154 -0.197 0.108 -0.01 
 (2.543) (0.622) (1.333) (-0.518) (-1.61) (-0.76) (-1.049) (0.747) (-0.108) 
LOWER* 
NETSELL 
-0.273 -0.128 -0.837*** -0.733*** 0.127 -2.45*** 
-
1.926*** 
0.626 0.024 
 (-1.583) (-1.132) (-6.377) (-5.632) (1.061) (-5.541) (-5.316) (1.521) (0.1) 
(-10%,-8%] -0.005*** 0.002*** -0.003*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.002 0.006** -0.003 0 
 (-6.286) (3.273) (-5.074) (3.006) (7.409) (0.805) (2.36) (-1.6) (0.081) 
(-10%,-8%]* 
NETSELL 
-0.214 -0.433*** -0.664*** -0.672*** 0.138 
-
1.864*** 
-0.541 -0.537 -0.373 
 (-0.985) (-3.183) (-4.21) (-4.498) (0.885) (-3.296) (-1.068) (-1.167) (-1.012) 
(-8%,-6%] -0.006*** 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001 0 -0.003* -0.003* 
 (-7.962) (2.886) (-2.872) (2.634) (6.463) (0.507) (0.043) (-1.685) (-1.647) 
(-8%,-6%]* 
NETSELL 
-0.568*** -0.257* -0.166 -0.31** -0.093 -0.728 1.09* 1.034* 0.097 
 (-2.772) (-1.716) (-1.041) (-2.177) (-0.589) (-1.323) (1.923) (1.841) (0.227) 
(-6%,-4%] -0.004*** 0.002*** 0 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.004** -0.001 0 
 (-7.285) (5.282) (0.397) (3.901) (4.007) (0.716) (1.974) (-0.53) (-0.368) 
(-6%,-4%]* 
NETSELL 
-0.588** -0.387** -0.017 -0.205 -0.062 -0.096 -0.206 0.535 -0.05 
 (-2.329) (-2.51) (-0.115) (-1.336) (-0.444) (-0.223) (-0.387) (1.465) (-0.2) 
SIZE 0 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0 0.001 
-
0.004*** 
-
0.001*** 
-
0.002*** 
 (-0.557) (5.633) (4.624) (7) (1.509) (1.617) (-8.155) (-3.139) (-6.866) 
TURNOVER 0.028** 0.009 -0.046*** -0.048*** 
-
0.053*** 
0.082** 
-
0.178*** 
-0.07*** -0.017 
 (2.555) (1.216) (-5.878) (-6.652) (-7.061) (2.557) (-6.175) (-2.935) (-0.798) 
VARIANCE 0* 0 0.001 0 0.001* 0.003*** 0 0 0 
 (1.866) (-0.138) (1.189) (-0.25) (1.768) (4.573) (0.027) (-0.008) (0.554) 
BETA 0.027*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.01*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.028*** 0.001 -0.001 
 (33.376) (11.613) (20.521) (20.786) (22.335) (5.138) (13.006) (0.415) (-0.821) 
constant -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.04*** 
-
0.022*** 
-0.029** 0.067*** 0.036*** 0.068*** 
 (-5.301) (-8.25) (-8.126) (-11.362) (-5.783) (-2.335) (5.903) (3.852) (7.995) 
Number 43629 43628 43627 43626 43625 43620 43604 43535 43395 
R.2 0.068 0.012 0.022 0.021 0.034 0.015 0.012 0.002 0.002 
Adjust.R.2 0.068 0.012 0.022 0.021 0.034 0.014 0.012 0.002 0.001 
 
Table 6 Regression analysis in Shenzhen stock Exchange 
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This table reports the regression evidence of regular stocks estimated from Eq. (5) and (6) in extreme days in Shenzhen stock 
market over 2010 to 2017, while samples are further separated according to from up or down extreme day. Panel A reports the 
findings in extreme up days, in which the key variable UPPER refers to regular stocks hitting 10% price limit and NETBUY 
refers to net buy of large trading investors. Panel B reports the regressions for regular stocks in extreme up days, in which the 
key variable LOWER refers to regular stocks hitting -10% price limit and NETSELL refers to net sell of large trading investors. 
All other variables are same as defined earlier. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses.  
Panel A Regular stocks from Shenzhen up extreme days 
 AR Day1 AR Day2 AR Day3 AR Day4 AR Day5 
CAR 
[6,10] 
CAR 
[11,20] 
CAR 
[21,60] 
CAR 
[61,120] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
UPPER 0.026*** 0.008*** 0 0.001** 0.006*** 0.005* -0.001 0 0.002 
 (22.198) (10.735) (-0.612) (1.958) (8.611) (1.802) (-0.448) (-0.102) (0.765) 
NETBUY -0.969*** -0.167** -0.342*** -0.413*** -0.054 1.325*** -0.388* 0.154 0.122 
 (-6.835) (-2.425) (-4.614) (-5.825) (-0.823) (3.267) (-1.851) (0.681) (0.479) 
UPPER* 
NETBUY 
1.413*** 0.182** 0.451*** 0.308*** -0.038 -1.56*** -0.129 -0.02 -0.254 
 (8.547) (2.149) (5.192) (3.662) (-0.496) (-3.53) (-0.454) (-0.073) (-0.873) 
[8%, 10%) -0.011*** -0.001 0 0.007*** 0.001 0.007** -0.005 -0.001 -0.007*** 
 (-8.395) (-1.073) (-0.62) (10.531) (1.255) (2.185) (-1.604) (-0.282) (-2.903) 
[8%, 10%)* 
NETBUY 
1.524*** 0.21 0.195 -0.043 -0.107 -1.772*** 0.425 0.121 0.249 
 (5.092) (1.635) (1.317) (-0.377) (-0.981) (-3.457) (1.295) (0.356) (0.66) 
[6%, 8%) -0.005*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0 0.011*** 0 0.004** -0.008*** 
 (-5.068) (1.974) (3.499) (9.239) (0.489) (4.895) (0.059) (2.11) (-3.846) 
[6%, 8%)* 
NETBUY 
1.39*** 0.101 0.469*** 0.064 0.057 -1.478*** -0.168 -1.293*** 0.172 
 (5.323) (0.949) (4.226) (0.586) (0.584) (-2.562) (-0.453) (-2.858) (0.422) 
[4%, 6%) 0.001* 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.004** 0 -0.001 -0.003** 
 (1.797) (2.56) (6.325) (5.63) (2.082) (2.351) (-0.082) (-0.646) (-2.14) 
[4%, 6%)* 
NETBUY 
1.33*** 0.214 0.174* 0.206 0.219* -0.131 -0.288 0.396 1.239 
 (6.197) (1.496) (1.666) (1.476) (1.837) (-0.212) (-0.651) (1.043) (1.423) 
SIZE -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0 -0.001*** -0.003*** 0 -0.001** -0.001*** 
 (-12.878) (-11.739) (-4.616) (-1.244) (-6.487) (-5.157) (-0.21) (-2.029) (-2.868) 
TURNOVER -0.121*** -0.097*** -0.027*** 0.002 -0.009* -0.082*** -0.058** -0.08*** 0.032* 
 (-12.683) (-16.717) (-4.667) (0.367) (-1.734) (-3.423) (-2.287) (-3.952) (1.662) 
VARIANCE 0*** 0** 0*** 0*** 0*** 0 0 0*** 0*** 
 (2.841) (2.031) (17.355) (9.405) (7.212) (1.458) (0.967) (14.67) (-7.824) 
BETA -0.001 0.003*** 0.001* -0.004*** 0.006*** 0.018*** -0.001 0.009*** 0.001 
 (-1.245) (6.462) (1.819) (-6.538) (10.938) (6.502) (-0.262) (3.673) (0.635) 
constant 0.066*** 0.029*** 0.01*** 0.007** 0.009*** 0.06*** 0.017 0.029** 0.044*** 
 (15.592) (10.523) (3.764) (2.455) (3.501) (4.452) (1.362) (2.484) (3.805) 
Number 47534 47533 47533 47532 47530 47523 47508 47363 47000 
R.2 0.047 0.017 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Adjust.R.2 0.047 0.017 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Panel B Regular stocks from Shenzhen down extreme days 
 AR Day1 AR Day2 AR Day3 AR Day4 AR Day5 
CAR 
[6,10] 
CAR 
[11,20] 
CAR 
[21,60] 
CAR 
[61,120] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
LOWER -0.043*** -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.014*** 0.02*** 0.003*** 0.01*** 
 (-64.917) (-2.93) (4.971) (13.263) (6.512) (7.846) (13.543) (2.608) (7.618) 
NETSELL 0.033 0.056* -0.014 -0.027 0.091*** -0.043 -0.048 -0.172* -0.214 
 (0.614) (1.785) (-0.381) (-0.876) (2.916) (-0.371) (-0.507) (-1.733) (-1.417) 
LOWER* 
NETSELL 
1.124*** 0.189*** 0.158** -0.168** -0.06 -0.012 0.02 0.388* -0.017 
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 (9.375) (2.874) (2.042) (-2.404) (-0.867) (-0.041) (0.07) (1.692) (-0.079) 
(-10%,-8%] -0.009*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.003* 0.004*** 
 (-12.306) (9.844) (7.695) (10.225) (7.002) (8.245) (3.496) (1.74) (2.807) 
(-10%,-8%]* 
NETSELL 
0.347** -0.249** 0.027 0.081 0.002 -0.336 -0.345 0.162 0.006 
 (1.978) (-2.337) (0.274) (0.939) (0.025) (-0.98) (-1.054) (0.522) (0.02) 
(-8%,-6%] -0.007*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.002* 0.001 
 (-10.673) (5.549) (5.338) (8.29) (7.014) (6.288) (2.782) (1.66) (0.865) 
(-8%,-6%]* 
NETSELL 
-0.194 0.078 0.033 0.032 -0.109 -0.886*** 0.035 0.617** 0.34 
 (-1.054) (0.913) (0.328) (0.458) (-1.357) (-2.872) (0.107) (2.046) (0.941) 
(-6%,-4%] -0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 (-8.92) (6.855) (7.766) (6.953) (3.647) (3.701) (1.465) (0.71) (-1.41) 
(-6%,-4%]* 
NETSELL 
-0.253* -0.231** 0.008 0.116 0.028 -0.295 -0.04 0.387 0 
 (-1.877) (-2.442) (0.082) (1.522) (0.343) (-0.925) (-0.131) (1.511) (-0.001) 
SIZE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0*** 0 0** 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002*** 
 (5.655) (5.504) (2.969) (0.243) (-2.295) (3.664) (-5.308) (-2.347) (-6.813) 
TURNOVER -0.005 -0.02*** -0.05*** -0.044*** -0.009** 0.044*** -0.064*** -0.012 0.027* 
 (-0.673) (-4.871) (-11.251) (-10.603) (-2.424) (2.584) (-4.007) (-0.803) (1.905) 
VARIANCE 0 0*** 0** 0 0 0.001 0 0.001 0 
 (1.611) (-3.547) (-2.246) (-0.498) (-0.129) (1.434) (1.483) (1.576) (-1.016) 
BETA 0.017*** -0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.002 0.003 0 -0.003** 
 (19.494) (-6.511) (8.629) (4.103) (1.352) (0.693) (1.548) (-0.109) (-2.239) 
constant -0.035*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.003 0.003 -0.033*** 0.054*** 0.03*** 0.067*** 
 (-8.728) (-3.588) (-4.866) (-1.624) (1.488) (-3.117) (5.929) (3.487) (8.451) 
Number 75678 75672 75663 75661 75653 75634 75589 75342 73219 
R.2 0.074 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.005 0 0.003 
Adjust.R.2 0.074 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.004 0 0.002 
 
5.3 Robustness check 
Similar to Dennis and Strickland (2002), we also define the extreme days as the absolute market return 
exceeding three standard deviations above mean. As such, we have 13 up and 24 down extreme days in 
SHSE, and 4 up and 25 down extreme days in SZSE. Our robustness checks do not include Shenzhen 
up days due to the lack of extreme day samples. Overall, the results of robustness check are 
quantitatively and qualitatively similar.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Utilizing the company level data of all listed stocks in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 
2010 to 2017, we investigate the impact of large trading, mostly initiated by institutional investors, on 
firm performance during extreme movement days. The post extreme day returns for price limit hitting 
stocks have been further examined, through which we find large trading on extreme day has 
significantly predictive power regarding to post extreme day returns. Price limit plays an important role 
for delayed price discovery on extreme days, and the trading behaviour by large investors not only 
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exacerbates the volatile market, but also impacts on the returns on post extreme days, particularly for 
the price limit hitting samples. 
 
In our extreme day study, we obtain the daily cash flow data for the largest trading group, as mostly 
traded by institutional investors. Our descriptive statistics suggest that on average, the large traders 
perform net buy (sell) behaviour on extreme up (down) days in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock Exchanges. 
We then investigate the impact of large trading, as a proxy for institutional trading, on firm performance 
on extreme days. We find significantly strong evidence that the trading initiated by large investors 
exacerbates the volatile stock market, which contrasts with Tian et al. (2018), suggesting that 
institutional ownership data used in prior extreme day study do not provide the clear institutional daily 
trading pattern. In the down extreme days, however, the net sell by large investors tend to decrease the 
abnormal turnover. 
In post extreme day study, we find the post extreme day stock return consistently continues to increase 
(decrease) for at least two subsequent days for regular stocks hitting 10% (-10%) price limit, which is 
contrast to Chen et al. (2019) who claim a significantly moderate price reversal on first subsequent day, 
indicating a delayed price discovery effect from the price limit policy. Our results provide strong 
evidence that net buying (selling) has significantly predictive power for price limit hitting stocks’ return 
(particularly for regular stocks) in subsequent days in both markets.  
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Appendix A. Extreme days in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Appendix A. reports all extreme days in Shanghai (Shenzhen) stock market when the absolute market 
value exceeds two standard deviations above mean. The table illustrates the extreme date, market return, 
number of A-shares, number of regular shares, number of regular shares for upper price limit hitting, 
number of ST shares, number of ST shares for upper price limit hitting and the percentage of upper 
price limit hitting for all A-shares. 
Panel A: Shanghai Up Extreme days 
Date 
Mean Return 
(%) Number Regular 
Upper Hit 
(Regular) ST 
Upper Hit 
(ST) 
Total 
Upper Hit 
24/05/2010 3.48 832 755 26 77 20 5.5% 
21/06/2010 2.9 831 752 4 79 7 1.3% 
08/10/2010 3.13 843 767 18 76 6 2.8% 
15/10/2010 3.18 835 760 14 75 3 2% 
13/12/2010 2.88 844 770 12 74 4 1.9% 
25/08/2011 2.92 877 801 8 76 2 1.1% 
12/10/2011 3.04 887 808 11 79 4 1.7% 
09/01/2012 2.89 891 818 24 73 19 4.8% 
17/01/2012 4.18 887 815 53 72 19 8.1% 
07/09/2012 3.7 924 885 31 39 1 3.5% 
05/12/2012 2.87 921 880 17 41 5 2.4% 
14/12/2012 4.32 919 879 23 40 3 2.8% 
14/01/2013 3.06 920 881 23 39 4 2.9% 
11/07/2013 3.23 907 879 16 28 1 1.9% 
09/09/2013 3.39 917 891 23 26 0 2.5% 
18/11/2013 2.87 905 877 17 28 1 2% 
02/12/2014 3.11 890 870 27 20 1 3.1% 
04/12/2014 4.31 889 869 34 20 1 3.9% 
08/12/2014 2.81 897 877 52 20 1 5.9% 
10/12/2014 2.93 906 885 46 21 2 5.3% 
25/12/2014 3.36 908 886 26 22 4 3.3% 
05/01/2015 3.58 915 891 51 24 1 5.7% 
15/01/2015 3.54 917 893 11 24 0 1.2% 
21/01/2015 4.74 919 895 25 24 2 2.9% 
27/04/2015 3.04 941 919 52 22 4 6% 
11/05/2015 3.04 938 913 79 25 8 9.3% 
19/05/2015 3.13 940 918 57 22 9 7% 
22/05/2015 2.83 938 917 107 21 11 12.6% 
25/05/2015 3.35 934 913 122 21 10 14.1% 
01/06/2015 4.71 933 912 159 21 8 17.9% 
30/06/2015 5.53 947 925 103 22 0 10.9% 
09/07/2015 5.76 661 640 576 21 4 87.7% 
10/07/2015 4.54 694 673 587 21 14 86.6% 
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17/07/2015 3.51 926 905 151 21 8 17.2% 
29/07/2015 3.44 941 919 156 22 2 16.8% 
04/08/2015 3.69 932 911 204 21 7 22.6% 
10/08/2015 4.92 934 911 119 23 7 13.5% 
27/08/2015 5.34 907 886 110 21 0 12.1% 
28/08/2015 4.82 909 888 218 21 13 25.4% 
08/09/2015 2.92 912 890 104 22 7 12.2% 
16/09/2015 4.89 920 898 334 22 8 37.2% 
08/10/2015 2.97 917 894 47 23 2 5.3% 
12/10/2015 3.28 917 894 43 23 3 5% 
04/11/2015 4.31 922 900 54 22 3 6.2% 
19/01/2016 3.22 998 972 54 26 15 6.9% 
29/01/2016 3.09 1006 979 26 27 3 2.9% 
16/02/2016 3.29 1003 976 50 27 6 5.6% 
02/03/2016 4.26 990 964 72 26 11 8.4% 
31/05/2016 3.34 1013 990 24 23 1 2.5% 
Panel B: Shanghai Down Extreme days 
Date 
Mean Return 
(%) Number Regular 
Lower Hit 
(Regular) ST 
Lower Hit 
(ST) 
Total 
Lower Hit 
13/01/2010 -3.09 839 769 0 70 3 0.4% 
20/01/2010 -2.93 834 767 0 67 12 1.4% 
19/04/2010 -4.79 823 752 18 71 40 7% 
06/05/2010 -4.11 840 761 7 79 13 2.4% 
17/05/2010 -5.07 834 758 97 76 49 17.5% 
29/06/2010 -4.27 817 746 28 71 43 8.7% 
10/08/2010 -2.89 834 759 1 75 9 1.2% 
12/11/2010 -5.16 831 755 66 76 54 14.4% 
16/11/2010 -3.98 842 766 15 76 13 3.3% 
17/01/2011 -3.03 858 779 7 79 15 2.6% 
20/01/2011 -2.92 849 771 2 78 8 1.2% 
23/05/2011 -2.93 859 784 6 75 38 5.1% 
25/07/2011 -2.96 877 802 5 75 25 3.4% 
08/08/2011 -3.79 866 792 20 74 43 7.3% 
30/11/2011 -3.27 882 809 4 73 19 2.6% 
21/02/2013 -2.97 918 887 0 31 1 0.1% 
04/03/2013 -3.65 912 882 37 30 3 4.4% 
28/03/2013 -2.82 914 887 3 27 1 0.4% 
13/06/2013 -2.83 898 870 5 28 7 1.3% 
24/06/2013 -5.3 901 872 69 29 14 9.2% 
10/03/2014 -2.86 915 894 6 21 0 0.7% 
09/12/2014 -5.43 902 881 61 21 13 8.2% 
23/12/2014 -3.03 906 883 12 23 3 1.7% 
19/01/2015 -7.7 920 896 99 24 5 11.3% 
05/05/2015 -4.06 935 909 12 26 10 2.4% 
28/05/2015 -6.5 934 912 225 22 11 25.3% 
16/06/2015 -3.47 929 909 27 20 15 4.5% 
18/06/2015 -3.67 932 911 33 21 11 4.7% 
19/06/2015 -6.42 934 913 381 21 18 42.7% 
25/06/2015 -3.46 947 925 28 22 5 3.5% 
26/06/2015 -7.4 951 929 736 22 21 79.6% 
29/06/2015 -3.34 947 925 471 22 19 51.7% 
01/07/2015 -5.23 946 924 318 22 19 35.6% 
02/07/2015 -3.48 942 920 526 22 20 58% 
03/07/2015 -5.77 933 911 536 22 22 59.8% 
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08/07/2015 -5.9 710 690 494 20 18 72.1% 
15/07/2015 -3.03 928 906 563 22 21 62.9% 
27/07/2015 -8.48 939 918 720 21 17 78.5% 
18/08/2015 -6.15 928 905 621 23 18 68.9% 
20/08/2015 -3.42 930 907 61 23 5 7.1% 
21/08/2015 -4.27 931 908 90 23 16 11.4% 
24/08/2015 -8.49 924 903 787 21 21 87.4% 
25/08/2015 -7.63 918 897 708 21 19 79.2% 
15/09/2015 -3.52 921 898 227 23 17 26.5% 
21/10/2015 -3.06 899 876 284 23 17 33.5% 
27/11/2015 -5.48 950 927 91 23 14 11.1% 
04/01/2016 -6.86 983 960 382 23 21 41% 
07/01/2016 -7.04 989 964 422 25 22 44.9% 
11/01/2016 -5.33 987 962 378 25 24 40.7% 
15/01/2016 -3.55 994 968 29 26 3 3.2% 
21/01/2016 -3.23 1002 976 35 26 8 4.3% 
26/01/2016 -6.42 1001 975 270 26 19 28.9% 
28/01/2016 -2.92 1005 979 67 26 9 7.6% 
25/02/2016 -6.41 990 964 436 26 21 46.2% 
29/02/2016 -2.86 987 961 139 26 21 16.2% 
06/05/2016 -2.82 1004 979 9 25 13 2.2% 
13/06/2016 -3.21 1019 993 41 26 14 5.4% 
Panel C: Shenzhen Up Extreme days 
Date 
Mean Return 
(%) Number Regular 
Upper Hit 
(Regular) ST 
Upper Hit 
(ST) 
Total 
Upper Hit 
24/05/2010 4.28 906 855 33 51 19 5.7% 
12/10/2011 3.5 1299 1253 21 46 4 1.9% 
09/01/2012 3.72 1336 1295 27 41 14 3.1% 
10/01/2012 3.85 1345 1304 40 41 9 3.6% 
17/01/2012 5.14 1342 1300 46 42 14 4.5% 
07/09/2012 3.75 1471 1427 34 44 2 2.4% 
05/12/2012 3.78 1478 1441 26 37 2 1.9% 
14/12/2012 4.12 1481 1441 20 40 3 1.6% 
14/01/2013 3.63 1471 1431 37 40 2 2.7% 
10/12/2014 3.5 1412 1399 68 13 2 5% 
20/01/2015 3.39 1402 1389 69 13 3 5.1% 
21/04/2015 3.88 1392 1381 112 11 8 8.6% 
08/05/2015 4.17 1414 1400 198 14 2 14.1% 
11/05/2015 4.48 1421 1407 203 14 4 14.6% 
21/05/2015 3.59 1419 1404 276 15 5 19.8% 
26/05/2015 3.58 1399 1384 248 15 8 18.3% 
01/06/2015 4.79 1385 1371 286 14 4 20.9% 
02/06/2015 3.52 1381 1366 297 15 4 21.8% 
30/06/2015 4.8 1388 1375 180 13 1 13% 
09/07/2015 3.76 678 667 645 11 7 96.2% 
10/07/2015 4.09 701 690 660 11 7 95.1% 
13/07/2015 4.18 842 831 753 11 7 90.3% 
17/07/2015 4.98 1223 1210 356 13 2 29.3% 
29/07/2015 4.13 1322 1308 245 14 3 18.8% 
04/08/2015 4.77 1333 1319 439 14 6 33.4% 
10/08/2015 4.49 1333 1320 183 13 7 14.3% 
28/08/2015 5.4 1366 1353 347 13 5 25.8% 
08/09/2015 3.83 1386 1372 232 14 1 16.8% 
16/09/2015 6.52 1405 1391 728 14 4 52.1% 
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21/09/2015 3.55 1411 1396 170 15 3 12.3% 
08/10/2015 4 1427 1411 138 16 1 9.7% 
12/10/2015 4.18 1433 1416 138 17 7 10.1% 
22/10/2015 3.71 1435 1420 169 15 2 11.9% 
04/11/2015 5.12 1471 1453 144 18 2 9.9% 
14/01/2016 3.81 1561 1541 108 20 2 7% 
19/01/2016 3.57 1556 1536 91 20 13 6.7% 
29/01/2016 3.71 1549 1529 77 20 3 5.2% 
02/02/2016 3.42 1550 1530 91 20 7 6.3% 
16/02/2016 4.1 1557 1538 124 19 7 8.4% 
02/03/2016 4.7 1553 1536 118 17 8 8.1% 
14/03/2016 3.56 1553 1537 80 16 5 5.5% 
17/03/2016 3.56 1555 1538 76 17 1 5% 
18/03/2016 3.65 1553 1536 103 17 1 6.7% 
30/03/2016 3.6 1536 1522 82 14 0 5.3% 
31/05/2016 4.09 1540 1523 72 17 2 4.8% 
Panel D: Shenzhen Down Extreme days 
Date 
Mean Return 
(%) Number Regular 
Lower Hit 
(Regular) ST 
Lower Hit 
(ST) 
Total 
Lower Hit 
20/01/2010 -3.67 814 768 8 46 6 1.7% 
19/04/2010 -4.42 879 828 17 51 22 4.4% 
06/05/2010 -3.65 891 837 6 54 10 1.8% 
17/05/2010 -5.97 888 838 105 50 30 15.2% 
18/06/2010 -3.61 929 876 26 53 12 4.1% 
29/06/2010 -5.44 934 885 42 49 30 7.7% 
12/11/2010 -6.12 1048 1001 78 47 32 10.5% 
16/11/2010 -3.49 1051 1002 16 49 9 2.4% 
17/01/2011 -4.25 1111 1062 23 49 11 3.1% 
20/01/2011 -3.4 1119 1072 1 47 4 0.4% 
23/05/2011 -3.63 1192 1143 14 49 30 3.7% 
25/07/2011 -3.75 1249 1204 6 45 13 1.5% 
08/08/2011 -4.43 1259 1215 46 44 28 5.9% 
30/11/2011 -4.01 1315 1275 23 40 19 3.2% 
05/01/2012 -3.52 1329 1288 73 41 16 6.7% 
13/01/2012 -3.52 1331 1290 34 41 4 2.9% 
14/03/2012 -4.09 1370 1332 3 38 21 1.8% 
28/03/2012 -4.06 1370 1328 31 42 23 3.9% 
16/07/2012 -3.63 1448 1402 83 46 9 6.4% 
04/03/2013 -3.54 1482 1430 32 52 13 3% 
20/06/2013 -3.39 1461 1436 4 25 3 0.5% 
24/06/2013 -6.1 1460 1435 96 25 15 7.6% 
08/07/2013 -3.57 1455 1434 18 21 6 1.6% 
02/12/2013 -4.96 1431 1409 334 22 14 24.3% 
25/02/2014 -3.96 1466 1446 69 20 3 4.9% 
10/03/2014 -3.47 1464 1446 37 18 1 2.6% 
09/12/2014 -4.31 1410 1397 122 13 6 9.1% 
22/12/2014 -3.64 1414 1400 200 14 6 14.6% 
19/01/2015 -3.39 1403 1391 36 12 1 2.6% 
15/04/2015 -3.68 1383 1372 85 11 3 6.4% 
28/05/2015 -5.52 1401 1386 321 15 7 23.4% 
16/06/2015 -3.59 1395 1384 101 11 9 7.9% 
18/06/2015 -3.57 1390 1377 109 13 5 8.2% 
19/06/2015 -5.88 1393 1380 593 13 13 43.5% 
25/06/2015 -3.76 1400 1387 106 13 3 7.8% 
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26/06/2015 -7.87 1409 1396 1232 13 11 88.2% 
29/06/2015 -6.05 1401 1388 1024 13 12 73.9% 
01/07/2015 -4.79 1396 1383 540 13 11 39.5% 
02/07/2015 -5.55 1378 1365 900 13 12 66.2% 
03/07/2015 -5.3 1336 1323 818 13 11 62.1% 
07/07/2015 -5.34 1135 1122 982 13 12 87.6% 
15/07/2015 -4.22 1167 1154 637 13 12 55.6% 
27/07/2015 -7 1312 1299 1021 13 11 78.7% 
18/08/2015 -6.58 1364 1351 915 13 11 67.9% 
21/08/2015 -5.39 1373 1360 248 13 11 18.9% 
24/08/2015 -7.7 1376 1363 1304 13 11 95.6% 
25/08/2015 -7.09 1379 1366 1166 13 10 85.3% 
01/09/2015 -4.61 1377 1363 718 14 9 52.8% 
14/09/2015 -6.65 1395 1381 968 14 10 70.1% 
15/09/2015 -4.97 1399 1385 466 14 11 34.1% 
25/09/2015 -3.44 1414 1398 49 16 2 3.6% 
21/10/2015 -5.94 1427 1414 549 13 12 39.3% 
27/11/2015 -6.09 1511 1493 210 18 5 14.2% 
04/01/2016 -8.22 1563 1545 906 18 16 59% 
07/01/2016 -8.24 1564 1546 939 18 16 61.1% 
11/01/2016 -6.6 1556 1537 865 19 16 56.6% 
13/01/2016 -3.46 1563 1543 129 20 11 9% 
15/01/2016 -3.4 1565 1545 53 20 1 3.5% 
21/01/2016 -4.01 1556 1536 78 20 6 5.4% 
26/01/2016 -7.12 1559 1540 734 19 13 47.9% 
28/01/2016 -4.18 1555 1535 180 20 10 12.2% 
25/02/2016 -7.34 1549 1533 907 16 12 59.3% 
29/02/2016 -5.37 1548 1533 449 15 10 29.7% 
20/04/2016 -4.43 1518 1501 58 17 7 4.3% 
06/05/2016 -3.65 1541 1519 16 22 8 1.6% 
09/05/2016 -3.59 1536 1514 84 22 14 6.4% 
13/06/2016 -4.76 1545 1528 189 17 10 12.9% 
27/07/2016 -4.45 1605 1583 72 22 7 4.9% 
12/12/2016 -4.86 1701 1673 169 28 10 10.5% 
16/01/2017 -3.62 1737 1706 57 31 17 4.3% 
17/07/2017 -4.28 1810 1792 361 18 9 20.4% 
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Appendix B. Analysis of ST stocks 
Appendix B. firstly demonstrates the methodology of regression for ST stocks and then report the tables 
of post extreme day findings for ST stocks. 
The regression of ST samples in extreme up days is specified as follows: 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛→𝑡+𝑚 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑈𝐹𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑈𝐹𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾11𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾12𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾13𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑛, 𝑚 𝜖{1,2,3,4,5,10,20,60,120} (B-7) 
where, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛→𝑡+𝑚 is the dependent variable, referring to the market-adjusted abnormal returns on 
day 1,2,3,4,5 and cumulative abnormal returns over days [6, 10], [11, 20], [21, 60] and [61, 120] for 
stock i after up extreme day t. 𝑈𝐹𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is dummy variable and equals to one if the ST stock i on event 
t hits the upper price limit of 5%. All other variables are defined as earlier. 
The coefficient on the interaction term between UFIVE and NETBUY is our core interest in the study. 
The positive coefficient of 𝛾3 translates Hypothesis 3, indicating the stronger price delayed effect after 
upper-price-limit hits with greater net buy of large trading investors in up extreme days. 
The regression of ST samples in extreme down days is specified as follows: 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛→𝑡+𝑚 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐿𝐹𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐿𝐹𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐵𝑈𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾11𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾12𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾13𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑛, 𝑚 𝜖{1,2,3,4,5,10,20,60,120} (B-8) 
where, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡+𝑛→𝑡+𝑚 is the dependent variable, referring to the market-adjusted abnormal returns on 
day 1,2,3,4,5 and cumulative abnormal returns over days [6, 10], [11, 20], [21, 60] and [61, 120] for 
stock i after up extreme day t. 𝑈𝐹𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is dummy variable and equals to one if the ST stock i on event 
t hits the lower price limit of 5%. All other variables are defined as earlier. 
The coefficient on the interaction term between LFIVE and NETSELL is our core interest in the study. 
The positive coefficient of 𝛾3 translates Hypothesis 3, indicating the stronger price delayed effect after 
lower-price-limit hits with greater net buy of large trading investors in down extreme days. 
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Table B-1 Post extreme day performance of ST stocks in Shanghai stock market 
Table B-1 presents the abnormal returns of ST stocks subsequent to extreme days in Shanghai stock market. The sample includes all ST stocks listed in Shanghai stock market 
from 2010 to 2017. CTO refers to the return calculated from the close price in extreme day and the open price in the following day. OTC refers to the return calculated from 
the open and close price on the following day. Day 2, 3, 4 and 5 refer to the abnormal return on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th relative to extreme day. [6, 10], [11, 20], [21, 60] and 
[61, 120] refer to the cumulative abnormal return from time window over 6th to 10th, 11th, to 20th, 21st to 60th, and 61st to 120th day relative to extreme day. The abnormal return 
is calculated as using stock’s daily return minus the expected return derived from market model. The table reports log returns. “***”, “**” and “*” represent the significance 
level at 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively. 
 CTO OTC Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 [6, 10] [11, 20] [21, 60] [61, 120] No. 
Panel A ST stocks in Shanghai up extreme days 
Upper Hit 0.84% 0.38%* 0.54%** 0.3% 0.02% 0.04% 0.58% -0.95% 0.8% 0.41% 213 
[4%, 5%) 0.03% 0.73%*** 0.34% 0.5%* 0.49%* 0.11% 0.39% 1.22%* 0.35% -0.56% 148 
[3%, 4%) 0.04% 0.88%*** 0.33%* 0.38%* -0.08% 0.31% 1.38%** 0.7% 1.34%** 0.54% 176 
[2%, 3%) -0.17%** 0.71%*** 0.42%** 0.62%*** -0.14% 0% 1.34%* 0.62% 0.56% 1.22%* 240 
[-2%, 2%) -0.11%* 0.09% 0.12% 0.07% -0.58%*** 0.07% -0.36% -0.51% 0.6% 0.05% 477 
(-5%, -2%) 0.14% -1.14%* -0.46% -1.02%* -1.51%** -0.72% -1.41% -1.28% -0.12% -2.23% 45 
Lower Hit -2.28%*** -0.34% -2.38%*** -2.06%*** -2.46%*** -0.44% -1.17% 0.43% -0.09% 0.56% 31 
Panel B ST stocks in Shanghai down extreme days 
Upper Hit 1.68%* 0.1% 0.3% -0.08% -1.79% -0.78% -0.94% -0.24% 0.6% 3.1% 26 
[2%, 5%) -0.18% 0.24% -0.61% -0.37% -1.07%* -0.75% 0.59% 0.8% -1.01% 0.33% 50 
[-2%, 2%) -0.54%*** 0.92%*** -0.07% 0.04% -0.67%*** -0.38%* 0.79%* 0.39% 0.98%* 0.5% 265 
[-3%, -2%) -0.18% 0.55%** 0.08% -0.18% -0.45%* -0.7%*** 0.03% 0.4% -0.06% 0.94% 159 
[-4%, -3%) -0.51%*** 1.03%*** -0.08% -0.13% -0.25% -0.24% 0.91%* 1.31%** 0.94%* 0.29% 179 
(-5%, -4%) -1.06%*** 0.37%** -0.18% -0.48%*** -0.51%*** -0.19% -0.42% 0.22% 1%* 1.45%** 305 
Lower Hit -2.46%*** 0.1% -0.86%*** -0.81%*** -0.89%*** -0.52%*** -1.17%*** 0.24% -0.06% 0.35% 796 
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Table B-2 Post extreme day performance of ST stocks in Shenzhen stock market 
Table B-1 presents the abnormal returns of ST stocks subsequent to extreme days in Shenzhen stock market. The sample includes all ST stocks listed in Shenzhen stock market 
from 2010 to 2017. CTO refers to the return calculated from the close price in extreme day and the open price in the following day. OTC refers to the return calculated from 
the open and close price on the following day. Day 2, 3, 4 and 5 refer to the abnormal return on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th relative to extreme day. [6, 10], [11, 20], [21, 60] and 
[61, 120] refer to the cumulative abnormal return from time window over 6th to 10th, 11th, to 20th, 21st to 60th, and 61st to 120th day relative to extreme day. The abnormal return 
is calculated as using stock’s daily return minus the expected return derived from market model. The table reports log returns. “***”, “**” and “*” represent the significance 
level at 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively. 
 CTO OTC Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 [6, 10] [11, 20] [21, 60] [61, 120] No. 
Panel A ST stocks in Shenzhen up extreme days 
Upper Hit 1.24%*** 0.26% 0.81%*** 0.47%* 0.44% 0.59%* 1.08% 0.23% 0.01% 1.62% 148 
[4%, 5%) -0.19% 0.95%*** 0.24% 0.28% 0.18% 0.36% 0.69% 1.68% 1.21% -0.13% 97 
[3%, 4%) -0.24%* 0.63%** 0.17% 0.43%* 0.42% 0.23% 0.77% 1.78%** 1.45%* 0.76% 96 
[2%, 3%) -0.12% 0.62%*** 0.29% 0.38%* 0.1% 0.26% 0.57% 0.8% 1.39%* 0.52% 138 
[-2%, 2%) -0.12% 0.58%** 0.54%* 0.03% 0.59%** 0.49%* 1.06% -1.11% 2.25%** 0.55% 142 
(-5%,-2%) -1.06% -3.45%** 0.71% 1.3% -0.05% 0.11% -5.12% -5.86% -0.06% 0.21% 8 
Lower Hit -3.25%* 1.51% -2.76% -0.74% -0.33% -0.97% 1.76% 0.49% 7.39% 9.39% 8 
Panel B ST stocks in Shenzhen down extreme days 
Upper Hit -0.38% 0.67% -1.03% -1.73% -0.24% -0.03% -1.18% -0.01% 1.79% -2.2% 17 
[4%, 5%) -1.11%*** 0.82% -1.35%** -0.85% -0.91%* -0.88%* -3.42%** -1.43% 0.03% -0.35% 39 
[3%, 4%) -0.67%*** 0.6%** -0.17% -0.4%* -0.34%* -0.47%** -0.44% -0.22% 0.23% 0.93% 170 
[2%, 3%) -0.49%*** 0.8%** 0.36%* -0.09% -0.12% -0.12% -0.08% 0.92% 0.32% 0.95% 105 
[-2%, 2%) -0.54%*** 0.62%** 0.37%* 0.02% -0.11% -0.25% -0.03% 0.14% -0.16% 0.49% 139 
(-5%,-2%) -0.86%*** 0.21% 0.08% 0.02% 0.04% 0.04% 0.2% 0.52% 1.22%** 0.77% 254 
Lower Hit -2.23%*** 0.07% -0.52%*** -0.29%** -0.26%* -0.02% -0.09% -0.06% 0.59% 0.99%** 564 
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Table B-3 Regression analysis for ST stocks in Shanghai Stock Exchange 
This table reports the regression evidence of ST stocks estimated from Eq. (B-7) and (B-8) in extreme days in 
Shanghai stock market over 2010 to 2017, while samples are further separated according to from up or down 
extreme day. Panel A reports the regressions for ST stocks in extreme up days, in which the key variable UFIVE 
refers to regular stocks hitting 5% price limit and NETBUY refers to net buy of large trading investors. Panel B 
reports the regressions for ST stocks in extreme down days, in which the key variable LFIVE refers to regular 
stocks hitting -5% price limit and NETSELL refers to net buy of large trading investors. All other variables are 
same as defined earlier. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  
Panel A ST stocks from Shanghai up extreme days 
 AR Day1 AR Day2 AR Day3 AR Day4 AR Day5 
CAR 
[6,10] 
CAR 
[11,20] 
CAR 
[21,60] 
CAR 
[61,120] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
UFIVE 0.007 0.005*** 0.002 0.006*** 0.001 -0.004 -0.006 0.006 0.008 
 (1.399) (2.958) (0.893) (2.851) (0.262) (-0.95) (-0.899) (0.779) (0.814) 
NETBUY 0.607*** 0.206 -0.055 -0.336** -0.676*** 0.027 0.164 0.902** -0.079 
 (3.492) (1.459) (-0.335) (-2.419) (-6.209) (0.048) (0.377) (2.165) (-0.2) 
UFIVE* 
NETBUY 
0.267 -0.201 0.075 -0.103 0.344 0.976* -0.682 -0.77 -0.636 
 (0.675) (-1.319) (0.336) (-0.525) (1.079) (1.817) (-1.01) (-1.213) (-0.831) 
SIZE 0 -0.003*** 0.001 0 0.003*** 0.003 -0.007*** -0.005 -0.006** 
 (0.169) (-2.963) (0.56) (0.45) (3.12) (0.868) (-2.662) (-1.441) (-1.961) 
TURNOVER -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.211*** -0.136*** -0.044 0.161 0.055 -0.019 -0.255** 
 (-2.959) (-2.757) (-3.996) (-2.914) (-0.929) (1.194) (0.492) (-0.143) (-2.032) 
VARIANCE -0.043 -0.002 0.02 0.022 -0.015 0.063 0.071 -0.015 -0.009 
 (-1.561) (-0.118) (0.794) (1.386) (-0.733) (0.812) (1.321) (-0.29) (-0.159) 
BETA -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 0.007 0.025*** 0.029*** -0.004 
 (-0.56) (-0.559) (-1.076) (-1.106) (-1.562) (0.753) (2.701) (3.693) (-0.451) 
constant 0.005 0.068*** -0.005 -0.01 -0.055*** -0.077 0.122** 0.086 0.137** 
 (0.211) (3.213) (-0.236) (-0.453) (-2.823) (-1.003) (2.161) (1.204) (2.187) 
Number 1330 1330 1330 1330 1329 1328 1326 1313 1286 
R.2 0.021 0.021 0.031 0.03 0.033 0.009 0.014 0.017 0.009 
Adjust.R.2 0.016 0.016 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.004 0.008 0.012 0.004 
Panel B ST stocks from Shanghai down extreme days 
 AR Day1 AR Day2 AR Day3 AR Day4 AR Day5 
CAR 
[6,10] 
CAR 
[11,20] 
CAR 
[21,60] 
CAR 
[61,120] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
LFIVE -0.023*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.002* 0 -0.01** -0.003 -0.008** -0.005 
 (-16.771) (-5.071) (-4.673) (-1.667) (-0.173) (-2.531) (-0.852) (-2.288) (-1.456) 
NETSELL -0.331 0.299** 0.36*** -0.267 -0.347*** -0.02 0.561* 0.238 -0.028 
 (-1.355) (2.293) (2.973) (-1.374) (-2.929) (-0.07) (1.707) (0.695) (-0.081) 
LFIVE* 
NETSELL 
0.701*** 0.007 -0.181 0.013 0.137 0.003 -1.701*** -0.175 -0.055 
 (2.666) (0.035) (-1.224) (0.054) (0.571) (0.007) (-3.569) (-0.414) (-0.12) 
SIZE -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001* -0.001 -0.008*** -0.001 -0.001 0.003 
 (-3.919) (-3.769) (-2.655) (-1.844) (-0.645) (-3.154) (-0.449) (-0.223) (0.84) 
TURNOVER -0.125*** 0.086** 0.031 -0.068* -0.019 0.026 -0.149 -0.036 -0.046 
 (-3.154) (2.007) (0.884) (-1.913) (-0.628) (0.306) (-1.578) (-0.386) (-0.334) 
VARIANCE -0.028 -0.003 -0.006 -0.017*** 0.012** 0.013 0.002 0.039** -0.033* 
 (-1.505) (-0.184) (-0.751) (-4.072) (2.185) (0.807) (0.164) (2.374) (-1.79) 
BETA 0.007* 0.008*** 0.004* 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.027*** 0.001 0.007 0.008 
 (1.925) (3.297) (1.931) (3.106) (5.568) (3.597) (0.115) (1.157) (1.193) 
constant 0.091*** 0.052*** 0.036** 0.016 -0.003 0.158*** 0.025 0.012 -0.049 
 (3.882) (3.155) (2.236) (1.192) (-0.17) (2.756) (0.648) (0.228) (-0.755) 
Number 1780 1779 1779 1779 1779 1775 1767 1751 1725 
35 
 
R.2 0.142 0.04 0.021 0.014 0.019 0.025 0.007 0.005 0.003 
Adjust.R.2 0.138 0.036 0.017 0.01 0.015 0.021 0.003 0.001 -0.001 
 
Table B-4 Regression analysis for ST stocks in Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
This table reports the regression evidence of ST stocks estimated from Eq. (B-7) and (B-8) in extreme days in 
Shenzhen stock market over 2010 to 2017, while samples are further separated according to from up or down 
extreme day. Panel A reports the regressions for ST stocks in extreme up days, in which the key variable UFIVE 
refers to regular stocks hitting 5% price limit and NETBUY refers to net buy of large trading investors. Panel B 
reports the regressions for ST stocks in extreme down days, in which the key variable LFIVE refers to regular 
stocks hitting -5% price limit and NETSELL refers to net buy of large trading investors. All other variables are 
same as defined earlier. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  
Panel A ST stocks from Shenzhen up extreme days 
 AR Day1 AR Day2 AR Day3 AR Day4 AR Day5 
CAR 
[6,10] 
CAR 
[11,20] 
CAR 
[21,60] 
CAR 
[61,120] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
UFIVE 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005* 0.004 0.008 -0.011 0.019 
 (3.769) (2.576) (2.283) (2.099) (1.75) (0.568) (1.135) (-1.202) (1.46) 
NETBUY 0.03 -0.16 -0.13 0.208 -0.1 -0.093 1.418** -1.196*** 0.442 
 (0.093) (-0.519) (-0.89) (0.971) (-0.271) (-0.18) (2.228) (-3.683) (0.94) 
UFIVE* 
NETBUY 
-0.269 -0.157 -0.619*** -0.904*** -0.363 0.77 -2.666** -0.204 -2.62*** 
 (-0.348) (-0.287) (-2.904) (-4.107) (-0.544) (1.105) (-2.204) (-0.438) (-2.876) 
SIZE 0.001 -0.005*** 0 0.001 0 -0.005* 0 -0.014*** -0.004 
 (0.502) (-5.874) (0.199) (0.695) (0.391) (-1.731) (0.016) (-3.087) (-0.87) 
TURNOVER 0.013 -0.064 -0.11** 0.003 -0.022 -0.069 -0.226 0.359 0.124 
 (0.099) (-0.656) (-2.304) (0.035) (-0.316) (-0.339) (-0.833) (1.433) (0.472) 
VARIANCE -0.034 0.05 0.042* 0.026 -0.021 -0.088 -0.219* -0.029 0.125 
 (-0.661) (1.387) (1.808) (0.902) (-0.641) (-1.182) (-1.692) (-0.197) (0.772) 
BETA 0.002 -0.003 -0.009 -0.015** -0.004 -0.028* -0.016 0 -0.003 
 (0.432) (-0.495) (-1.599) (-2.495) (-1.046) (-1.865) (-0.861) (-0.005) (-0.156) 
constant -0.01 0.111*** 0.005 -0.004 0 0.142** 0.034 0.307*** 0.089 
 (-0.393) (6.325) (0.192) (-0.146) (0.004) (2.252) (0.34) (3.245) (0.872) 
Number 637 637 637 637 637 637 636 627 609 
R.2 0.026 0.039 0.047 0.032 0.013 0.014 0.032 0.032 0.013 
Adjust.R.2 0.015 0.028 0.036 0.021 0.002 0.003 0.021 0.021 0.001 
Panel B ST stocks from Shenzhen down extreme days 
 AR Day1 AR Day2 AR Day3 AR Day4 AR Day5 
CAR 
[6,10] 
CAR 
[11,20] 
CAR 
[21,60] 
CAR 
[61,120] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
LFIVE -0.019*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0 0.002 
 (-9.966) (-4.412) (-1.179) (-0.829) (0.902) (-0.182) (-0.562) (-0.101) (0.514) 
NETSELL 0.245 0.409*** -0.036 -0.438** 0.128 3.198*** 0.214 0.418 0.445 
 (0.828) (3.605) (-0.15) (-2.561) (1.033) (2.789) (0.605) (1.007) (1.162) 
LFIVE* 
NETSELL 
-0.962 0.347 0.84* 0.545 -0.13 -2.899* 0.61 -0.903 -0.516 
 (-0.693) (0.843) (1.952) (1.558) (-0.388) (-1.792) (0.444) (-1.045) (-0.563) 
SIZE -0.003*** -0.002** 0 0.002* 0.003*** -0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 
 (-2.879) (-2.536) (0.095) (1.882) (3.344) (-1.281) (-0.26) (1.621) (-0.572) 
TURNOVER 0.089 -0.11*** -0.053 -0.075* -0.058* 0.087 -0.072 0.037 -0.17 
 (1.186) (-2.757) (-1.559) (-1.769) (-1.69) (0.685) (-0.619) (0.3) (-1.346) 
VARIANCE -0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.016** -0.005 -0.001 0.008 
 (-0.69) (1.443) (1.386) (-0.454) (1.453) (1.967) (-1.494) (-0.432) (1.099) 
BETA -0.012*** -0.007** 0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.019** -0.007 -0.005 0.006 
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 (-3.045) (-2.334) (1.396) (0.51) (0.518) (-2.013) (-0.97) (-0.601) (0.565) 
Constant 0.068*** 0.043*** -0.006 -0.035* -0.058*** 0.078 0.025 -0.083 0.043 
 (3.177) (3.06) (-0.354) (-1.95) (-3.475) (1.563) (0.42) (-1.383) (0.667) 
Number 1288 1288 1288 1287 1287 1286 1285 1276 1242 
R.2 0.119 0.047 0.011 0.012 0.019 0.038 0.003 0.003 0.005 
Adjust.R.2 0.114 0.042 0.005 0.006 0.013 0.033 -0.003 -0.003 0 
 
 
